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"To A Moral Certainty": Theories of




In many American jurisdictions the jury is instructed that the prose-
cution must prove the defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt and
to a moral certainty." At first glance, "to a moral certainty" appears to
be one of those typical redundancies of common law that seek to cure
ambiguity by compounding it. Because it troubles us that "beyond rea-
sonable doubt" conveys no very precise meaning, we add a second
phrase, "to a moral certainty," but it conveys even less meaning and
makes our whole problem worse. Only a few quite well-educated older
people who have read a great deal of nineteenth-century literature are
likely even to have said, "I am morally certain that you left your coat in
the restaurant" or "Are you morally certain that you came into the room
before he did?" It is the kind of phrase that a screenwriter might put in
the mouth of a country storekeeper to suggest a slightly bookish,
straight-laced, religious old man still living in an earlier age. Even those
few people who might use the phrase would be using the word "moral"
as a kind of pretentious substitute for "very." If most of us understand
the question "Are you morally certain?" at all, we understand it as "Are
you very certain?"
In recent years, a great deal of jurisprudential concern has centered
on the ambiguity of the various forms of instruction which surround
"reasonable doubt" with a bouquet of elaborations and explanations.
Justice Stanley Mosk's concurrence in the California case of People v.
Brigham I has been a catalyst for this growing concern. Justice Mosk's
view is now incorporated in a bill before the California legislature. It
would strip everything except the phrase "reasonable doubt" itself from
* Professor of Rhetoric, University of California, Berkeley. B.A. 1956, U.C.L.A.; M.A.
1958, Ph.D. 1966, Harvard University.
1. 25 Cal. 3d 283, 292-316, 599 P.2d 100, 107-21, 157 Cal. Rptr. 905, 913-27 (1979)
(Mosk, J., concurring).
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the instruction. There can be little doubt that the California activity
presages a national trend. In all of this activity, "moral certainty" has
been singled out as a particular villain. Justice Mosk has issued a chal-
lenge: "I'd like to hear someone attempt to tell ... [us] what 'moral
certainty' is."2
I think I can respond to this challenge. The remainder of this article
tells what the concept of moral certainty is by tracing the intellectual
origins of the phrase and the ways in which it entered and has been pre-
served by the law. One purpose of the enterprise is purely scholarly and
is directed to an abiding question of legal theory: to what extent does the
law develop autonomously and to what extent does it borrow its key
ideas from other areas of thought? A second purpose, however, is to
contribute to the current policy debate over changing the jury instruc-
tion. To briefly anticipate my conclusion here, an examination of the
intellectual history of "moral certainty" supports the conclusion that the
phrase does not convey to contemporary jurors what it was intended to
convey when it was introduced. On the other hand, the key ideas that
the phrase was designed to convey can be understood by modern jurors
and continue to be as important to the jury's process of reaching conclu-
sions as they were when the phrase was introduced. Thus, the history of
moral certainty that follows does suggest that the phrase ought to be
dropped, but it also suggests that a substitute ought to be introduced and
what the substance of that substitute should be.
Whether legal change is ever an autonomous development driven by
its own internal dynamics rather than caused by other economic, social,
and intellectual forces is a subject of never-ending debate in the commu-
nity of legal scholars. Common lawyers have always thought that the
very heart of the common law was procedure and thought of themselves
as experts at procedure even if expert at nothing else. We should expect
then that if any part of the history of common law should exhibit autono-
mous development it should be the history of the law of procedure and,
most especially, that procedure which involves the most peculiar and
deeply embedded feature of the common law, the jury. It is the purpose
of this study to show that certain very crucial developments of the proce-
dural law of juries have been molded, both in form and content, by extra-
legal intellectual developments.
Common-law jurisdictions observe two kinds of rules of evidence.
The first, which deals with what kinds of evidence may get to the jury
when and in what form, can be understood without much reference to
2. San Francisco Chron., May 6, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
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nonjury developments. The second deals with the evaluation by the jury
of the evidence, and how it is to decide whether there is sufficient proba-
tive evidence to justify a verdict. Such rules are drawn from the culture's
general understanding of how we "know" things to be true. This paper
deals with this second variety and its relation to developments in episte-
mology in seventeenth-century England.
I
The seventeenth-century intellectual crisis which resulted from a
growing dissatisfaction with scholastic philosophy and from the threat of
skepticism was not the first to influence rules of evidence. A much
deeper crisis occurred during the twelfth century when "irrational
proofs," such as trial by ordeal, could no longer be seen as consistent
with justice or with how truth determinations ought to be made. "Irra-
tional proofs" were replaced on the Continent by the Roman-canon in-
quisition process and in England by the jury trial.
The "rational" system of proof of the Roman-canon inquisition pro-
cess was operated by professional judges who sought to obtain "full
proof" by applying clearly established evidentiary standards which rig-
idly specified the quality and quantity of proof. A specified number of
witnesses were required to prove facts and once "full proof" had been
achieved conviction was automatic. The judge was essentially an ac-
countant who totaled the proof fractions. Criminal cases, for example,
required two good witnesses or confession. Since confession was of par-
ticularly high evidentiary value, torture was employed to assist in pro-
ducing it. Complex rules determined whether there was sufficient
evidence to justify judicial torture. Because the philosophical compo-
nents in the Roman-canon system had been provided by late medieval
scholastic philosophers and because the system had become well-en-
trenched on the Continent during that period, it seems to have been rela-
tively uninfluenced by the epistemological issues that became acute in the
early modem period.
In England "irrational proofs" were replaced by the jury trial,
which initially required little in the way of rules of evidence. Jurors, men
of the neighborhood, were assumed to know the facts and to incorporate
their own knowledge into the verdict. Juries thus arrived at findings of
fact guided by common sense and common knowledge.
As society became more complex and mobility increased, however,
juries became less familiar with the facts and came to rely on the testi-
mony of witnesses. Juries did not give up the right to consider personal
knowledge in reaching verdicts but increasingly relied on witnesses and
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documents which had to be evaluated for truthfulness and accuracy. Ju-
rors became third parties who had to employ their rational and analytical
faculties to reach conclusions about facts and events they had not person-
ally witnessed or previously known. A turning point occurred in 1563
when legislation compelled the attendance of witnesses and made perjury
a crime.3 As witnesses became more important, juries increasingly re-
quired standards for the evaluation of testimony. Notions of credibility,
borrowed in part from the civil and canon law, began to appear, although
for a time there was confusion between the concepts of legal and credible
witnesses-the former being legally competent to testify, the latter being
those whose testimony is believable. Discussions of witness credibility
and the evaluation process thus entered the legal literature and the cases
as the character of the jury trial was modified. The work of Sir Matthew
Hale indicates that, by the late seventeenth century, the distinction be-
tween legal and credible witnesses was very clear.4
The response to this new legal environment was slow, but when the
law of evidence emerged in the eighteenth century, it had been shaped
not only by legal tradition but by the intellectual environment. We must
therefore turn to the intellectual currents which would bear on how ju-
ries might reach rational conclusions based on evaluations of fact.
By the sixteenth century, humanist critiques had made the defects of
scholastic philosophy and logic commonplace, though they did little to
develop a substitute. The revival of skepticism was philosophically more
serious since it might have entailed not only a repudiation of scholasti-
cism but of religious doctrine, the validity of sense data, reports of
events, indeed any claims to knowledge.5 Philosophers, notably
Descartes and Bacon, attempted to overcome the skeptical critique and
the defects of scholasticism by re-founding knowledge on a certain but
nonscholastic basis. Cartesianism denied that knowledge provided by
the senses might be certain and devalued disciplines dependent on experi-
ment or testimony. It therefore had little impact on law. Bacon's new
empirical philosophy emphasized appropriately filtered and manipulated
3. For the best discussion of the evolution of the jury trial, see generally T. GREEN,
VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH TRIAL JURY 1200-
1800 (1985). Jurors were required to be of the vicinity until 1705.
4. M. HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND at
xxviii-xxix, 346-47 (6th ed. London 1820); M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 277 (London 1736) [hereinafter M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN]; see also M. HALE,
THE PRIMITIVE ORIGINATION OF MANKIND 128 (London, 1677) [hereinafter M. HALE,
PRIMITIVE ORIGINATION]; Shapiro, Law and Science in Seventeenth Century England, 21
STAN. L. REV. 727, 757-60 (1969).
5. See R. POPKIN, THE HISTORY OF SCEPTICISM FROM ERASMUS TO SPINOZA (1979).
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sense data, but also sought absolutely certain axioms and universally
valid generalizations.
6
The seventeenth-century English philosophic and scientific commu-
nity, however, was neither Baconian nor Cartesian, for it did not claim
that empirically derived facts would yield absolutely certain knowledge.
It attempted to verify natural phenomena by experiment, direct observa-
tion, and testimony, and believed that these techniques, depending on the
quality and the quantity of the evidence derived, might yield conclusions
sufficiently true to serve as the basis for the conduct of human affairs.
The attempt to build an intermediate level of knowledge, short of
absolute certainty but above the level of mere opinion, was made by an
overlapping group of theologians and naturalists. For the Protestant
theologians, who rejected Catholic assertions of infallibility, the central
question was whether religious truths such as the existence of God, mira-
cles, the Biblical narratives, and various doctrines and practices of the
Church could survive skeptical attack, once stripped of claims to abso-
lute truth and reduced to claims based on evidence. For the naturalists
the central problem was that of making truthful statements about natu-
ral phenomena which could be observed but could not be reduced to the
kinds of logical, mathematical demonstrations that traditionally had
been held to yield necessary, unquestionable truth. Both groups con-
cluded that reasonable men, employing their senses and rational facul-
ties, could derive truths that they would have no reason to doubt.
7
Although terminology varied, English naturalists and theologians
distinguished between "knowledge" or "science" on the one hand and
"probability" on the other. They identified three sub-categories of
knowledge, each possessing a different kind of certainty: physical, de-
rived from immediate sense data; mathematical, established by logical
6. Bacon was not only an important philosopher of science but also a prominent legal
figure. He was Lord Chancellor and played an important role in the movement for reform.
See Shapiro, Sir Francis Bacon and the Mid-Seventeenth Century Movement for Law Reform,
24 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 331, 331-62 (1980). For works linking Bacon's philosophy of science
to the law, see Kocher, Francis Bacon and the Science of Jurisprudence, 8 J. HIST. IDEAS 3- 26
(1957); Wheeler, The Invention of Modern Empiricism: Judicial Foundations of Francis Ba-
con's Philosophy of Science, 76 LAW LIBR. J. 78-120 (1983); Kenneth Cardwell, Francis Bacon
and the Inquisition of Nature (Apr. 1986) (unpublished paper delivered at the Pacific Coast
Conference of British Studies).
7. For a more complete discussion see R. BURNS, THE GREAT DEBATE ON MIRACLES
19-40 (1981); B. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENG-
LAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE, RELIGION, His-
TORY, LAW AND LITERATURE (1983); H. VAN LEEUWEN, THE PROBLEM OF CERTAINTY IN
ENGLISH THOUGHT 1630-1690 (1963); R. WESTFALL, RELIGION AND SCIENCE IN SEVEN-
TEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1958).
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demonstration such as the proofs in geometry; and moral, based on testi-
mony and secondhand reports of sense data. This moral certainty was
most relevant to law, history, and many kinds of natural science.
Although they did not depend on evidence that compelled assent, moral
certainties might be so clear that everyone "whose judgment is free from
prejudice will consent unto them. And though there be no natural ne-
cessity, that such things be so, and that they cannot possibly be otherwise
... yet may they be so certain as not to admit of any reasonable doubt
concerning them." 8
"Probability" traditionally had lumped together the noncertain, the
seemingly true, and the merely likely. When evidence was unclear or
reasonable doubt existed, the result was probability or mere opinion, not
knowledge. A late seventeenth-century development suggested that
probability consisted of a graduated scale that extended from the unlikely
through the probable to a still higher category called "rational belief" or
"moral certainty." This latter category, sometimes treated as "knowl-
edge" and sometimes as the highest category of probability, was to have a
great impact on the law.9
We must make particular mention of John Locke, both because the
systematization of this approach in his 1690 Essay Concerning Human
Understanding became so influential and because the first treatise writers
on legal evidence attempted to build on Lockean foundations. What
others called moral certainty was for Locke a species of probability, the
very highest level of which commanded universal assent. It rose "so near
to a certainty" that it governed one's thinking "as absolutely ... as the
most evident demonstration." Lower levels of probability produced
"confidence," "confident belief," or "mere opinion." The level of assent
was determined by the weight of the evidence.l0
8. J. WILKINS, OF THE PRINCIPLES AND DUTIES OF NATURAL RELIGION 7-8 (London
1675) (Moral certainty "may properly be styled indubitable."); see also id. at 10-11; W.
CHARLETON, IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL 186 (London 1657). The "reasonable
man" will not require demonstration or proofs that "exclude all Dubiosity, and compel as-
sent," but will accept moral and physical proofs that are the best that may be gained. One
could gain a "competent certitude where demonstration-is impossible ... ." Id. at 186-88.
9. See D. PATEY, PROBABILITY AND LITERARY FORM (1984); B. SHAPIRO, supra note
7, at 163-93; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 727; Waldman, Origins of the Legal Doctrine of Reason-
able Doubt, 20 J. HisT. IDEAS 299 (1959).
10. J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. IV, ch. XVI
(London 1690).
The highest degree of Probability is, when the general consent of all Men, in all Ages
* ..concurs with a Man's constant and never-failing Experience in like cases, to
confirm the Truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair Witnesses ....
These Probabilities rise so near to Certainty, that they govern our Thoughts as abso-
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For the new scientists and philosophers, natural phenomena and
processes were to be verified by experiment, observation, and the testi-
mony of observers. Depending on the quality and quantity of the evi-
dence produced by these methods, one might reach findings of fact and
sometimes even conclusions that no reasonable person could doubt."1
Historians too were attracted to this approach. Discussions of both
historical events and Scripture frequently centered on the extent to which
one might believe the testimony of witnesses reporting on past occur-
rences. References to eye-and-ear witnesses, hearsay, and credible wit-
nesses were common. This language of course suggests the courtroom.
Indeed, naturalists, theologians, and historians often employed court-
room imagery. Historians were thus frequently admonished to act as un-
lutely ... as the most evident demonstration .... [W]e make little or no difference
between them and certain knowledge....
[The] next degree of Probability is, when I find by my own Experience, and the
Agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be for the most part so, and that
the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted Witnesses: v.g. His-
tory giving us such an account of Men in all Ages, and my own Experience, as far as
I had an opportunity to observe,... and in this case our Assent has a sufficient
foundation to raise itself to a degree, which we may call Confidence....
[A still lower category existed] when any particular matter of fact is vouched by
the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses, there our Assent is also una-
voidable.... This, though in the nature of things there be nothing for nor against it;
yet, being related by Historians of credit, and contradicted by no one Writer, a Man
cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it as he does of the Being and
Actions of his own Acquaintance, where he himself is a Witness....
[In all three of these categories] the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon
such grounds carries so much evidence with it that it naturally determines the Judg-
ment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as a Demonstration does.
... The difficulty is, when Testimonies contradict common Experience, and the
report of History and Witnesses clashes with the ordinary course of Nature, or with
one another; there it is, where Diligence, Attention, and Exactness is required, to
form a right Judgment, and to proportion the Assent to the different Evidence and
Probability of the thing; which rises and falls, according as those two foundations of
Credibility, vi Common Observation in like cases, and particular Testimonies in
that particular instance, favours or contradicts it....
[These, however, were] liable to so great variety of contrary Observation, Cir-
cumstances, Reports, different Qualifications, Tempers... of the Reporters, that it is
impossible to reduce to precise Rules the various degrees wherein Men give their
Assent. This only may be said in general, that as the Arguments and Proofs, pro and
con, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to
any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or lesser degree to preponderate
on either side; so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such different entertainments,
as we call Belief Conjecture, Guess, Doubt, Wavering, Distrust, Disbelief etc.
Id. §§ 6-9 (emphasis in original). This is followed by a discussion of attesting docu-
ments and copies of documents, and hearsay evidence. Id. § 10.
11. See B. SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 15-73.
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biased and impartial judges rather than partisan advocates. 12
Seth Ward, in comparing sacred and secular history, for example,
emphasized that when witnesses related improbable events, it was partic-
ularly important to evaluate critically the relators and the manner of
their relations. It was necessary to determine whether the event in ques-
tion was knowable, whether the parties had sufficient means to obtain
such knowledge, whether the relators were "eye or ear" witnesses and
whether the occurrences "were publically acted and known." Historians
might be believed if the relators had the opportunity to observe the
events in question and no one had contradicted their accounts. Although
fabrications were possible, there was little reason, given the lack of con-
flicting accounts, to doubt the events reported in secular history or the
"History of Holy Scripture." Ward, in what became commonplace
among historians and Anglican ecclesiastics in the late seventeenth cen-
tury, thus argued that no impartial person could reasonably doubt the
truthfulness of Biblically reported events and matters of fact. 13 Virtually
the same line of argument based on the absence of "reasonable doubt"
rather than absolute certainty was advanced by Edward Stillingfleet, an
Anglican divine who wrote widely on theological and epistemological is-
sues, to establish the moral certainty of Scriptural history.14
By the early eighteenth century these views were commonplace
among historians and required little defense or comment. Thus, Joseph
Addison noted that secular historians were guided by
the common rules of historical faith, tlat is, they examined the nature
of the evidence which was to be met within common fame, tradition,
and the writings of persons who related them, together with the
number, concurrence, veracity and private characters of those persons;
and being convinced, upon all accounts that they had the same reason
to believe the history of our Saviour as that of any other person to
which they were not actually eyewitnesses, they were bound by all the
rules of historical faith, and of right reason, to give credit to this
history. 15
By 1690, when Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding
12. Id. at 140-49, 155-59.
13. S. WARD, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY TOWARD AN EVICTION OF THE BEING AND
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 84-88, 90, 99-101, 102, 117 (5th ed. London 1677) (1st ed. London
1654).
14. E. STILLINGFLEET, ORIGINES SACRAE (London 1662); see also R. CARROLL, THE
COMMON-SENSE PHILOSOPHY OF BISHOP EDWARD STILLINGFLEET 1635-1699 (1975); S.
PARKER, A DEMONSTRATION OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION
at xxvii, xxix, 176, 179 (London 1681); Popkin, The Philosophy of Bishop Stillingfleet, 9 J.
HIST. PHIL. 303, 303-19 (1971).
15. 1 J. ADDISON, THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOSEPH ADDISON 420
(London 1721).
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appeared, ideas of witness credibility had become familiar to lawyers,
naturalists, theologians, and historians. Locke's criteria for evaluating
testimony, "the number of witnesses, their integrity, their skill at present-
ing evidence, and its agreement with the circumstances, and lastly, the
presence or absense of contrary testimony," had obvious relevance for
the law. 16 A considerable portion of the English intellectual community
adopted this empirical approach to knowledge-which neither denied the
possibility of gathering reliable and persuasive evidence nor made claims
to absolute certitude. This approach also came to serve the needs of the
English legal system.
As we have already seen, initially there had been little need to con-
struct a rationale for the truth-finding capacities of juries who reached
verdicts based on their own common sense and knowledge of the facts.
As the role of witnesses increased in the late medieval and early Roman
period, the problem of the credibility of second-hand reports of facts that
had become central to theologians, naturalists, and historians became
central to legal theorists who borrowed conceptual elements from the
new empirical philosophy.
Sir Matthew Hale, the most distinguished judge of the mid- to late
seventeenth century, thus emphasized the superiority of the jury trial as
"the best Method of searching and sifting out the Truth," precisely be-
cause juries might "weigh the Credibility of Witnesses, and the Force
and Efficacy of their Testimonies." 17 Hale, however, not only emphasized
credibility but made the distinction between legal and credible witnesses
very clear. Hale indicated that if jurors had
just cause to disbelieve what a Witness swears, they are not bound to
give their Verdict according to the Evidence, or testimony of that wit-
ness; and they may sometimes give Credit to one Witness, tho[ugh]
opposed by more than one. And indeed, it is one of the Excellencies of
... [the jury trial] above the Trial by Witnesses, altho[ugh] the jury
ought to give a great Regard to Witnesses and their Testimony, yet
they are not always bound by it; but may either upon reasonable Cir-
cumstances, inducing a Blemish upon their Credibility, tho[ugh] other-
wise in themselves in Strictness of Law they are to be heard, pronounce
a Verdict contrary to such Testimonies, the truth whereof they have
just Cause to suspect, and may and do often pronounce their Verdict
16. J. LOCKE, supra note 10, bk. IV, ch. XV, § 5. Locke's criteria may owe something to
canon and civil law-suggesting the mutual influence of philosophy and law. See also R.
BURNS, supra note 7, at 59-61.
17. M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 164-65 (C. Gray ed. 1971). Civil
law judges in contrast were "precisely bound by rules." Id. at 164. Sir Edward Coke had little
to say about credibility, although he noted that jurors were to consider the credit "upon the
exceptions taken against him." E. COKE, INSTITUTES *6a.
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upon one single testimony, which Thing the Civil Law admits not of.'8
Hale's 1677 Primitive Origination of Mankind discussed evidence for
matters of fact contained in Scripture in much the same way as in legal
trials. It was necessary to weigh
the veracity of him that reports and relates it. And hence it is, that
that which is reported by many Eye-witnesses hath greater motives of
credibility than that which is reported by few; that which is reported
by credible and authentic witnesses, than that which is reported by
light and inconsiderable witnesses; that which is reported by a person
disinterested, than that which is reported by persons whose interest is
to have the thing true, or believed to be true; ...and finally, that
which is reported by credible persons of their own view, than that
which they receive by hear-say from those that report on their own
view. 19
Belief for Hale rested on the direct experience of the senses and "upon
the relation of another that we have no reasonable cause to suspect."
'20
"Evidence of Fact and Things remote from our Sense," though not infal-
lible, yet might be of such "high credibility, and such as no reasonable
Man can without any just reason deny his assent unto them. '21 While
Hale did not use the words "moral certainty" or "beyond reasonable
doubt," his terminology is consistent with those concepts.
II
Although some scholars have suggested that the medieval practice
of treating all evidence given under oath as of equal weight continued
into the eighteenth century, 22 the state trials of the late seventeenth cen-
tury and beyond are larded with judicial insistence that juries weigh the
credibility of witnesses.23 Issues of credibility, which became increas-
18. M. HALE, supra note 17, at 164. Hale also distinguished between lawful and credible
witnesses. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 4, at 277. English juries did not
have to "reject one Witness because he is single or always to believe the Witnesses if the
Probability of the Fact does upon Circumstances reasonable encounter them." M. HALE,
supra note 17, at 164.
19. M. HALE, PRIMITIVE ORIGINATION, supra note 4, at 129. The hearsay rule appears
to date from about 1675-1690. Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedure at Criminal Law, 1500-
1800, in CRIME IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 39 (J. Cockburn ed. 1977).
20. M. HALE, PRIMITIVE ORIGINATION, supra note 4, at 52, 128.
21. Id. at 128. In 1699, the Royal Society's Philosophical Transactions reported an effort
to mathematize "moral certainty absolute," in which "the mind of man entirely acquiesces."
256 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS 359-65 (1699). The anonymous author attempted to rate
the credibility of the reporter according to his integrity or fidelity and his double ability of
"apprehending what is delivered" and of "retaining" it so it can be transmitted.
22. See, e.g., 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 196, 204-09 (1926); Wig-
more, The Required Number of Witnesses, 15 HARV. L. REV. 83, 88-90 (1901).
23. See B. SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 185-86; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 758-60. Prior to
1661 the law of treason required only the testimony of "lawful" not "credible" witnesses.
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ingly central to criminal trials, also helped to shape the standard for the
jury verdict. The "satisfied conscience" standard, initially a vague notion
employed because the jury was on oath, became the vessel into which
were poured the new criteria for evaluating facts and testimony. "Satis-
fied conscience" gradually became synonymous with rational belief, that
is, belief beyond reasonable doubt. The newer standards borrowed heav-
ily from religious and philosophical foundations, particularly from no-
tions of moral certainty, or the highest degree of probability. This is not
to say that juries, particularly in capital cases, had not always required
convincing proof,24 but rather that legal formulations concerning that
conviction were increasingly stated in terms which were consistent with
reigning epistemological formulations.
The recorded cases after 1668 exhibit sufficient repetition to suggest
contemporary usage.25 A number of phrases appear repeatedly in judi-
cial charges. The first is "if you believe," the second, "if you are satisfied
Older views did not immediately disappear. Evidently few of the peers who had condemned
the Earl of Stafford had "believed the witnesses." The witnesses had "sworn the facts" and
therefore the peers claimed they had no choice but to accept them. Sometime after the trial,
Judge North angrily informed the peers who had expressed this view that their behavior was
"contrary to the very institution of trials." They must not try "the grammatical construction
of words ... but the credibility of persons and things ... which required collaction [sic) of
circumstances and a right judgement ... if you believe the witnesses find, else not." 1 R.
NORTH, THE LivEs OF THE NORTHS 303-14 (A. Jessopp ed. 1890).
Confusion concerning the juries' treatment of witnesses was not the only type of difficulty.
While it is clear that jurors had become judges of the facts, they were nevertheless entitled to
know things on their own. If by 1650 one judge had ruled that a juryman who wished to
present evidence must be heard on oath in court like any other witness, another in 1670 in-
sisted that jurors might still act on their knowledge. See R. BAKER, THE HEARSAY RULE
(1950) (citing Benett v. Hartford, 1 Style 233, 82 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1650)); Bushell's Case,
1 Vaughan 135, 149, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1013 (C.P. 1670). In 1698 Judge Holt ruled, still
somewhat tentatively,
In Case a Jury give a Verdict upon their own knowledge, they ought to tell the Court
so, but the fairest way would be for such of the Jurors as had knowledge of the
matter before they are sworn, to inform the court of the thing, and be sworn as
witnesses.
I Holt K.B. 404, 404, 90 Eng. Rep. 1122, 1122 (1698) (per curiam).
24. See T. GREEN, supra note 3, passim.
25. The English lav reporting tradition did not include regular coverage of criminal trials
during this period. The cases which do not appear in the nominate law reports rarely include
the charge to the jury. The Proceedings at Old Bailey are too brief to be helpful; most report
little except the verdict. Accordingly, most of the cases cited in this Article are taken from
T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD (London 1809-1826) (33 vols.)
[hereinafter abbreviated Howell St. Tr.]. It is unfortunate that we must rely so heavily on
State Trials, which are unevenly distributed over time and often involve emotionally laden
political trials rather than more typical ones; however, there is no reason to believe that the
bench in these cases employed atypical legal concepts or terminology.
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or not satisfied with the evidence." A third is "satisfied conscience. '26
Verdicts were to be based on "belief," or "satisfied conscience," and were
to be arrived at after evaluation of the evidence.
In Bushell's Case 27 Chief Justice Vaughan insisted that testimony
and verdict were "very different things." A witness swears to what he
has seen or heard while a juryman swears "to what he can infer and
conclude from the testimony... by the act and force of his understand-
ing." By 1670 juries were already expected to be careful and thorough
fact evaluators.
The Popish Plot trials, many of which gained wide circulation in
pamphlet form, provide a substantial number of well-reported cases. The
most common judicial directives to the jury included phrases such as "if
you believe" or "if you believe on the evidence," '28 "if you believe what
the witness swore,"' 29 and "if the evidence is sufficient to satisfy your
conscience." °30 In some instances belief was linked to the satisfied con-
science test.
31
26. See, e.g., Trial of James, 6 Howell St. Tr. 67, 82 (K.B. 1660) (high treason); Trial of
Dover, 6 Howell St. Tr. 539, 559; (Old Bailey 1663) (sedition); Trial of Turner, 6 Howell St.
Tr. 566, 614, 615 (Old Bailey 1668) (burglary). Edward Waterhouse noted that the jury's
verdict was "as they Think in their Conscience" the Truth of the facts after hearing the evi-
dence. FORTESCUE ILLUSTRATUS 259 (1663). They were to "determine what their con-
sciences judge clearly proved concerning the fact." Id.
27. 1 Vaughan 135, 149, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1013, 6 Howell St. Tr. 999, 1006 (C.P.
1670). If judges could direct verdicts there would be no need for a jury. Chief Justice
Vaughan also noted that juries might have personal knowledge of the case unknown to the
judge and that jurors, like judges, might legitimately come to different conclusions after hear-
ing the same evidence. Neither Vaughan nor his successors indicated how the formulation of
belief in a single juror might be made compatible with the need for a unanimous verdict. For
recent discussions of Bushell's Case, see T. GREEN, supra note 3, at 200-04; John Philip, Jurors
and Judges in Late Stuart England: The Penn/Mead Trial and Bushell's Case (Apr. 1986)
(unpublished paper delivered before the Pacific Coast Conference on British Studies).
28. See, e.g., Trial of Thompson, 8 Howell St. Tr. 1359, 1386 (N.P. 1682) (libel); Trial of
Blague, 9 Howell St. Tr. 653, 666 (Old Bailey 1683) (high treason).
29. See, e.g., Trial of Lewis, 7 Howell St. Tr. 249, 255 (Monmouth assizes 1670) (high
treason); Trial of Brommich, 7 Howell St. Tr. 715, 726 (Stafford assizes 1683) (high treason);
Trial of Gascoigne, 7 Howell St. Tr. 959, 1041 (K.B. 1680) (high treason); Trial of Busby, 8
Howell St. Tr. 525, 550 (Derby assizes 1681) (high treason); Proceedings against Fitzharris, 8
Howell St. Tr. 243, 338 (K.B. 1681) (high treason); Trial of Lord Grey, 9 Howell St. Tr. 127,
178, 183 (K.B. 1682) (misdemeanor debauchery of Lady Berkeley); Trial of Ward, 9 Howell
St. Tr. 299, 350 (K.B. 1683) (perjury); Trial of Rouse, 9 Howell St. Tr. 637, 654 (Old Bailey
1683) (high treason).
30. Trial of Green, 7 Howell St. Tr. 159, 220 (K.B. 1670) (murder); Trial of Wakeman, 7
Howell St. Tr. 591, 681, 686 (Old Bailey 1679) (high treason); Trial of Thwing, 7 Howell St.
Tr. 1162, 1179 (York assizes 1680) (high treason); Proceedings against Fitzharris, 8 Howell St.
Tr. 243, 338 (K.B. 1671); Trial of Bethel, 8 Howell St. Tr. 747, 810 (1681) (assault and
battery).
31. See, e.g., Trial of Whitebread, 7 Howell St. Tr. 311, 414 (Old Bailey 1679) (high
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Several well-known and much reprinted Whig political-legal writers
employed the "satisfied conscience" test in 1680, a year when legal issues,
grand jury indictments, and petty jury verdicts were much in the public
eye as a result of the Exclusion crisis. Government efforts to prosecute
leading Whig Exclusionists led to several dramatic trials. According to
Sir John Hawles, a well-known Whig lawyer, a juror could not become
"fully satisfied in the conscience" until he had carefully considered the
matter, as well as the course of life of the testifier and the "credit of the
Evidence."' 32 A satisfied conscience was thus closely linked to the credi-
bility of the testimony. Hawles also insisted that juries must be "satisfied
in [their] . . . particular Understanding and Conscience" of the "truth
and Righteousness of ... [a] verdict." 33 Juries thus must give verdicts
"according to their Conscience and the best of their Judgment. ' 34 Echo-
ing Chief Justice Vaughan, he noted that jurors must follow their own,
not another's, "Understanding or Reasoning. '35
Henry Care, another Whig writing in 1680 about the political trials
of the day, employed a similar "fully satisfied conscience" standard.3
6
There is no question that Care, as well as Hawles and Vaughan, expected
jurors to bring their reasoning faculties to bear on the evidence and testi-
mony before them and that the term "satisfied conscience" was the term
most often employed to denote a proper verdict.
The widespread use of the terminology of conscience in late seven-
teenth- and early eighteenth-century trials occurred at a time when Prot-
estant discussions of conscience-that is casuistry-began increasingly to
involve analysis of rational moral choice and rational decision-making.
Protestant theologians and moralists of the late seventeenth century re-
jected both the doctrine of "casuistical probabalism" which had required
treason); Trial of Ireland, 7 Howell St. Tr. 79, 135, 751 (Old Bailey 1678) (high treason); Trial
of Cellier, 7 Howell St. Tr. 1183, 1207 (Old Bailey 1680) (libel); Trial of Carr, 7 Howell St. Tr.
1111, 1130 (Guildhall 1680) (libel); see also Trial of Brommich, 7 Howell St. Tr. 715, 726
(Stafford assizes 1679) (high treason); Trial of Bethel, 8 Howell St. Tr. 747, 757 (1681) (assault
and battery). In other instances juries were required not only to weigh the credibility of wit-
nesses but to weigh and consider circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Trial of Brommich, 7
Howell St. Tr. 715, 726 (Stafford assizes 1679) (high treason); Trial of Thwing, 7 Howell St.
Tr. 1162, 1179-80 (York assizes 1680) (high treason).
32. See 3. HAWLEs, THE ENGLISHMAN'S RIGHT: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A BARRISTER
AT LAW AND A JURYMAN I (London 1680). This work was reprinted in 1693 and appeared
in at least 12 English, Irish, and American editions in the eighteenth century.
33. Id. at 38.
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id. at 35.
36. H. CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE 214
(6th ed. Providence, R.I. 1774) (1st ed. London 1680); see also T. WILLIAMS, THE EXCEL-
LENCY AND PRAEHEMINENCE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 18 (London 1680).
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only a single authority to support a moral decision-a position associated
with the Jesuits-and emotional or intuitive responses.37 The examples
of Jeremy Taylor and Samuel Pufendorf should suggest something of the
intersection between legal concepts of "satisfied conscience" and similar
concepts in the realm of moral theology and natural law.
Jeremy Taylor, whose lengthy treatise Ductor Dubitantum went
through numerous editions, explained the role of the "satisfied" or
"sure" conscience in moral theology.38 What is most interesting for our
purposes is Taylor's repeated insistence that conscience is a function of
the understanding, not of the passions. To go against conscience was "no
other than as they do things against their reason." The conscience was
"the Mind" and was made primarily by "the Understanding. ' 39 The
"Sure" or "Right" conscience was characterized by "moral certainty," a
concept which, we have seen, was widely employed by natural theolo-
gians, natural philosophers, and historians. Thus Taylor's discussion of
conscience predictably asserted that if moral things were not capable of
mathematical or demonstrative certainty, they might nevertheless be
"very highly probable.' 'O The "practical judgment of a right con-
science" was "always agreeable to the speculative determination of the
understanding" and required "full persuasion. ' 41 Thus, a "sure" or "sat-
isfied" conscience, according to the most respected late seventeenth-cen-
tury English casuist, required the full persuasion achieved by means of
the rational faculties.42
The terminology of casuistry and moral theology also pervaded Sa-
muel Pufendorf's 1703 Law of Nature and Nations, which came to have a
substantial following in England. Pufendorf began with a discussion of
"moral entities" and the "certainty of moral science." He was anxious to
37. See J. McADOo, THE STRUCTURE OF CAROLINE MORAL THEOLOGY (1949); T.
WOOD, ENGLISH CASUISTICAL DIVINITY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1952). Casuistry
refers to the methods of reaching ethical decisions in particular cases.
38. J. TAYLOR, DUCTOR DUBITANTUM 3 (London 1660).
39. Id. at 3-4.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 30, 55.
42. Taylor also discussed the "confident or erroneous conscience," "the probable or
thinking conscience," and the "doubting conscience." The first was described in much the
same way as latitudinarians and natural philosophers described dogmatism and superstition.
The "probable or thinking conscience," which lay between the "sure" and "doubting" con-
science, could, at least on certain occasions, be "made certain by accumulation of many
probabilities operating the same persuasion." Id. at 90. Such an accumulation of probabilities
might be called "a moral demonstration." It required that both sides of a question be ex-
amined by an unbiased will. Christianity might be proved by "moral demonstration." Id. at
93-107. Taylor considered the "doubting conscience" to be a "disease" rather than a guide to
human action. Id. at 157.
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refute both the common opinion of the European learned community
that moral knowledge lacked the certainty of philosophy and especially
of mathematics, and the Hobbesian notion that ethics and politics were
capable of demonstration.4 3 What is interesting about Pufendorf for our
purposes is the way in which he linked "conscience," a concept so impor-
tant in English legal terminology, to the concepts of moral certainty and
belief beyond reasonable doubt.
For Pufendorf the rightly informed conscience could derive from
two sources: persuasion built on certain principles, or persuasion which
is "true and certain; and sees no reason to doubt it." 4 The latter he
explicitly related to the law. The concept of certainty beyond reasonable
doubt is thus implicit in his argument from probabilities. Pufendorf thus
argued for the "certainty of Moral sciences" and denied that they could
"rise no higher [than] a probable Opinion." Moral knowledge or at
least portions of it were not less certain mathematics.45 Increasingly,
conscience, casuistry, moral theology, and natural law were discussed in
terms of moral certainty. Moral discussions, like religious belief, scien-
tific findings, and historical evaluation, required a reasoned assessment
based on the most complete information and evidence available. The
"satisfied conscience" of the juryman in the courtroom and that of the
individual in his closet required rational, unbiased, and unemotional acts
of the understanding.
46
The cases between 1683 and 1700 employed language similar to
those of 1668-1683, although the number of judicial statements which
linked believing the witnesses and reaching a satisfied conscience ap-
peared more often than other formulations.47 In law, conscience was
43. S. VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 11, 17-18 (B. Kennet
& W. Percivale trans. Oxford 1703).
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id. at 17.
46. It seems likely that concepts relevant to the law and philosophy of evidence may be
traced by considering the evolution of moral theology, moral evidence, and discussions of evi-
dence in the human and natural sciences. Samuel Clarke explicitly used the language of "satis-
faction," "evidence of matter of fact," and "reasonable and sufficient proof" in connection
with legal disputes and proofs of Christianity. S. CLARKE, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING NAT-
URAL RELIGION 14, 331-34, 336-37 (3d ed. London 1711) (1st ed. London 1706).
47. Trial of Roswell, 10 Howell St. Tr. 147, 242 (K.B. 1684) (high treason); Trial of Lisle,
11 Howell St. Tr. 297, 370 (Winton 1685) (high treason); Trial of Grahme, 12 Howell St. Tr.,
645, 810 (Old Bailey 1691) (high treason); Trial of Harrison, 12 Howell St. Tr. 833, 870 (Old
Bailey 1692) (murder); Trial of Lord Mohun, 12 Howell St. Tr. 949, 1042 (H.L. 1692) (mur-
der); Trial of Charnok, 12 Howell St. Tr. 1377, 1455 (Old Bailey 1696) (high treason); Trial of
Parkyns, 13 Howell St. Tr. 63, 133 (Old Bailey 1696) (high treason); Trial of Rookwood, 13
Howell St. Tr. 139, 265 (K.B. 1696) (high treason); Trial of Cook, 13 State Trials 313, 393
(Old Bailey 1696) (high treason). In one perjury trial the jury was directed to "weigh and
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"satisfied" only when the reasoning faculties were exercised upon the evi-
dence. The question of "doubt" in the minds of the jury was rarely
raised explicitly in the late seventeenth century.
48
The language of the 1700 to 1750 cases did not differ substantially,
although references to conscience became fewer. It was the "mind" or
"judgment" rather than the "conscience" which was to reach conclu-
sions on the evidence. The need to be "satisfied," however, did not de-
cline.49 The most common directives employed "belief" based on
evidence.50 Judges insisted that verdicts be based on evidence and fre-
quently admonished jurors to take great care in weighing and examining
it. In several cases the terms "belief" and "satisfaction" were used syn-
onymously. A guilty verdict was appropriate if the jurors "believed," an
acquittal if they were not "satisfied. '5 1 Notions of satisfaction and belief
formed by evaluating evidence were the most common feature of jury
charges in this period.5 2
consider what is sworn now, and from thence to make a conclusion whether you are not satis-
fied that innocent blood has been spilt by means of this fellow." Trial of Oates, 10 Howell St.
Tr. 1079, 1212 (K.B. 1685). "[T]ake care to examine strictly and impartially ... and weigh the
evidence which has been given on all sides .... [I]t is incumbent upon you to enquire whether
you have not sufficient reason to be satisfied that the truth now is." Id. at 1212. "[If you
think that the witnesses swear true, as I cannot see any colour of objection, there does not
remain the least doubt.., that the accused" was guilty. Id. at 1226. The accused in this case
was Titus Oates.
48. In the Trial of Stafford, however, the prosecution indicated that "the evidence is so
strong, that I think admits of no doubt." The proofs "[are] so clear and evident, as well leave
no room to your lordships to believe" Stafford's protestations. Trial of Stafford, 7 Howell St.
Tr. 1293, 1305, 1515, 1517 (H.L. 1680) (high treason). In the Trial ofLanghorn, the Recorder
indicated that there was not the "least reason for the most scrupulous men to doubt the credi-
bility of the witnesses." TRIAL OF LANGHORN 67 (London 1679); see also Trial of Oates, 10
Howell St. Tr. 1079, 1211 (K.B. 1685) (perjury).
49. "If you are satisfied with the whole matter" was not an atypical formulation. Trial of
Hurley, 14 Howell St. Tr. 377, 445 (K.B. 1701) (perjury); Trial of Layer, 16 Howell St. Tr. 93,
299 (K.B. 1722) (high treason). The phrase "the whole matter" refers to a combination of
witness testimony and circumstantial evidence.
50. Trial of Fuller, 14 Howell St. Tr. 517, 535 (Guildhall 1702) (cheat and imposter);
Trial of Dammaree, 15 Howell St. Tr. 521, 611 (Old Bailey 1710) (high treason); Trial of
Willis, 15 Howell St. Tr. 613, 651 (Old Bailey 1710) (high treason); Trial of Layer, 16 Howell
St. Tr. 93, 299 (K.B. 1722) (high treason); Trial of Acton, 17 Howell St. Tr. 461, 522 (Guild-
hall 1729) (murder); Trial of Godere, 17 Howell St. Tr. 1003, 1078-79 (Bristol assizes 1741)
(murder); Trial of White, 17 Howell St. Tr. 1079, 1090 (Bristol assizes 1741) (murder).
51. Trial of Layer, 16 Howell St. Tr. 93, 299 (K.B. 1722) (high treason); Trial of Hales,
17 Howell St. Tr. 161, 208-09 (Old Bailey 1728) (forgery).
52. Occasionally, different terminology was employed. Thus one judge used, "if you are
sensible and convinced." Trial of Franklin, 17 Howell St. Tr. 625, 675 (K.B. 1731) (seditious
libel). Another indicated a guilty verdict was appropriate if they had no doubt upon the evi-
dence. Trial of Hales, 17 Howell St. Tr. 209, 226 (Old Bailey 1728) (forgery). Doubt in the
jury's minds was still not often mentioned in the charge.
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The second half of the century presented a somewhat more complex
but not fundamentally different picture. Judges and legal counsel began
to concern themselves with doubts that legitimately might appear in the
minds of jurors.5 3 Most cases still exhibited the familiar formulas em-
phasizing "belief."' 54 The requirement that the jury be "fully satisfied" or
"satisfied" on the basis of the evidence continued as a common feature.55
We do, however, notice a more secular terminology. The phrase "if
you believe the evidence" was often replaced by "if you think the evi-
dence . . .- 56 The term "judgment" or "understanding" also became
more frequent. One judge advised a jury to "exercise your judgments"
on the evidence.5 7 The "understandings" of the jury must be "absolutely
coerced to believe."5 8 Another judge noted that jurors "were rational
men and will determine according to your consciences, whether you be-
lieve those men guilty or not." 59 Coerced assent was, as we have seen, a
53. For the increased importance of legal counsel in criminal trials, see Langbein, The
Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 263 (1978).
54. Trial of de la Motte, 21 Howell St. Tr. 687, 713, 813, 814 (London 1781) (high trea-
son); Proceedings against Jackson, 25 Howell St. Tr. 783, 876 (K.B. 1781) (high treason); Trial
of Hart, 26 Howell St. Tr. 387, 414 (Dublin 1796) (high treason); Trial of Binn, 26 Howell St.
Tr. 595, 652 (Warrick assizes 1797) (sedition); Trial of Maclane, 26 Howell St. Tr. 721, 811
(Quebec 1797) (high treason); Trial of Dunn, 26 Howell St. Tr. 839, 872 (Dublin 1797) (mur-
der). Another common formula asked the "opinion" of the jury. Trial of Lord Byron, 19
Howell St. Tr. 1177, 1233 (H.L. 1765) (murder); Trial of Redhead, 25 Howell St. Tr. 1003,
1154 (York assizes 1795) (conspiracy); Trial of Finerty, 26 Howell St. Tr. 901, 1008 (Dublin
1797) (seditious libel). "Opinion" had a far lower status than "satisfied belief" in common
terminology, and would have been viewed as far below "moral certainty."
55. Trial of de la Motte, 21 Howell St. Tr. 687, 814 (London 1781) (high treason); Trial
of Gordon, 22 Howell St. Tr. 175, 208 (K.B. 1787) (libel); Jones v. Shipley, 21 Howell St. Tr.
847, 949-50 (K.B. 1783) (seditious libel); Trial of Weldon, 26 Howell St. Tr. 225, 280-81 (Dub-
lin 1795) (high treason).
56. Trial of M'Daniel, 19 Howell St. Tr. 745, 845 (Old Bailey 1755) (accessory to a fel-
ony); Trial of Gordon, 21 Howell St. Tr. 485, 647 (K.B. 1781) (high treason); Proceedings
against Eaton, 22 Howell St. Tr. 753. 822 (Old Bailey 1793) (libel, for publishing Thomas
Paine's The Rights of Man); Trial of Redhead, 25 Howell St. Tr. 1003, 1154 (York assizes
1795) (conspiracy).
57. Trial of Handy, 24 Howell St. Tr. 199, 383 (Old Bailey 1794) (high treason); see also
Trial of Redhead, 25 Howell St. Tr. 1003, 1154 (York assizes 1795) (conspiracy). The "judg-
ment" would consider whether the weight of the evidence was sufficient or not. Trial of Cross-
field, 26 Howell St. Tr. 1, 222 (Old Bailey 1796) (conspiracy).
58. Trial of Weldon, 26 Howell St. Tr. 225, 286 (Dublin 1795) (high treason). A guilty
verdict was appropriate "if your understandings are absolutely coerced to believe." Coerced
assent for Locke and others was associated with the highest degree of probability or "moral
certainty."
59. Trial of Glennan, 26 Howell St. Tr. 437, 457 (Dublin 1796) (high treason). In an-
other case the jury was advised to judge "by the result of the evidence and the clear impres-
sions that the result shall make upon your minds." It was not to judge on mere probabilities.
Trial of Tooke, 25 Howell St. Tr. 731, 743 (Old Bailey 1794) (high treason). In another they
were to find the truth "according to your conscience and the best of your judgments." Trial of
November 1986]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
characteristic of moral certainty and of Locke's highest degree of
probability. As with casuists, the understanding and the conscience were
concerned with the same, not different, mental processes and both in-
volved rational deliberation. Although terms like "mind," "understand-
ing," and "judgment" have an obviously more secular flavor than
"belief" and "conscience" and were sometimes substituted for them, we
must beware of making sweeping statements about secularization, for the
more secular terms often appear together with the more traditional ones.
We can, in these cases, trace a growing concern for situations in
which juries might have doubts about evidence and thus about their ver-
dicts. Their minds might be "suspended in such a degree of that doubt"
that they could not be "satisfied."60 In a case of 1752 the prosecution
suggested that the evidence was "so strong, so convincing, . . . that that
Presumption that will rise to a Conviction; there will not remain the least
Doubt of it."'61
This period witnessed the first use of the "beyond reasonable doubt"
standard so familiar to modern ears. Anthony Morano has suggested
that the "beyond reasonable doubt" test was introduced by the prosecu-
tion and that it actually was designed to provide less protection to the
accused than the "any doubt" test which did not require that doubts be
reasonable.62 My reading of the cases and the treatise literature is some-
what different. I do not think the "any doubt" terminology had ever
meant that juries should acquit on the basis of frivolous doubt. The
phrase "moral certainty" was taken to mean proof beyond reasonable
doubt. If one had real doubts, moral certainty was not reached. The
phrase "beyond reasonable doubt" was, I believe, not a replacement of
the "any doubt" test but was added as a clarification of the notion of
Leary, 26 Howell St. Tr. 295, 350 (Dublin 1795) (same). The evidence was to carry "convic-
tion brought home to your minds." Id. at 351; see also Trial of Kennedy, 26 Howell St. Tr.
353, 386 (Dublin 1796) (same); Trial of Hart, 26 Howell St. Tr. 387, 437 (Dublin 1796)
(same); Trial of Watt, 23 Howell St. Tr. 1167, 1386 (Edinburgh 1794) (same).
60. Proceedings against Jackson, 15 Howell St. Tr. 783, 876, 877 (K.B. 1795) (high trea-
son). In another case jurors were told that if "the scale should hang doubtful" and they were
not "fully satisfied," they should acquit. Trial of Gordon, 21 Howell St. Tr. 485, 647 (K.B.
1781) (high treason); see also Proceedings against Frost, 22 Howell St. Tr. 471, 519 (K.B.
1793) (sedition). In another, jurors were told to acquit if "there remains any doubt upon the
case." Trial of Tooke, 25 Howell St. Tr. 1, 739 (Old Bailey 1794) (high treason). Judges who
raised the possibility of doubt were also more likely to suggest the possibility of acquittal.
Jurors were thus more likely to be reminded that the benignity of English law was in favor of
life and of the legal maxim that taught that it is preferable for 10 or even 100 guilty men to go
free rather than one innocent man die.
61. THE GENUINE TRIAL OF SWANN 4 (London 1752).
62. Morano, A Reexamination of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U.L. REV. 507, 514-
15 (1975).
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moral certainty and satisfied belief. Indeed, many of the cases that enun-
ciated the "beyond reasonable doubt" test for acquittal employed the
phrases "if you believe," or "if your conscience is satisfied," or "if you
are satisfied with the evidence" when stating what was required for con-
viction. Reasonable doubt was simply a better explanation of the satis-
fied conscience standard that resulted from increasing familiarity with
the "moral certainty" concept.
Morano's research, however, has established that the "beyond rea-
sonable doubt" standard was first employed in the Boston Massacre tri-
als of 1770, rather than at the turn of the century in the Irish treason
trials.63 Interestingly, the Boston cases do not suggest that the standard
was considered innovative, for both prosecution and bench emphasized
that the accused were being tried according to traditional English us-
age.64 The prosecution, appealing to the jury's "Cool and Candid Rea-
son," indicated that if the "Evidence is not sufficient to Convince beyond
reasonable Doubt," the jury must acquit. The prosecution, of course,
asserted that the evidence was "sufficient to convince you of their Guilt
beyond reasonable Doubt. ' 65 The judges, however, employed the tradi-
tional "fully satisfied" and "satisfied belief" formulations as well as "if
upon the whole, ye are in any reasonable doubt of their guilt, ye must
then, agreeable to the rule of law, declare them innocent. '66
We should not be surprised, however, that the introduction of the
"reasonable doubt" standard appeared to be neither novel nor controver-
sial in the Boston cases precisely because it was consistent with the no-
tions of "belief," "satisfied conscience," and "moral certainty" employed
in and out of the courtroom. In fact, Sir Geoffrey Gilbert's authoritative
The Law of Evidence, the first major treatise devoted entirely to legal
evidence, had appeared in several editions before 1770 and had used simi-
lar language. 6
7
Thus in 1777, in one of the rare cases tried at Old Bailey fully re-
63. See id. at 516-19.
64. 3 THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 270 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
65. Id. at 271-73.
66. Id. at 292, 299-300, 309. John Adams, on another occasion, argued that each jury-
man had the right and duty "to find the Verdict of the Case according to his own best Under-
standing, Judgment and Conscience," even though it might be in direct opposition to the
direction of the court. I id. at 230.
67. G. GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Dublin 1754). It would not, therefore, be
unreasonable to expect "beyond reasonable doubt" language any time after 1754, the year
Gilbert's treatise first appeared. Indeed, given the scanty published records of trials for the
eighteenth century, it may well have been employed but no evidence of it remains, although we
must note that it does not appear in the published State Trials before 1795, nor is it found in
the legal writing of Coke, Hale, or Blackstone.
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corded in shorthand, Counsel Mansfield told the jury, "If the evidence be
such as 'irresistably prove' [the crime],... if you see any room upon the
evidence to doubt of his being guilty, if you are not perfectly convinced
you must find the accused not guilty."' 68 The reasonable doubt formula-
tion also appeared in a 1796 Canadian case. The jury was informed that,
if they had any reasonable doubt, they must acquit "for it is the invaria-
ble direction of our English Court of Justice" to lean on the side of
mercy.
69
We must look, if only briefly, at the language of the turn of the
century Irish trials, many of which employed the reasonable doubt stan-
dard in conjunction with the notion of satisfied conscience and belief. In
the 1795 Trial of Weedon, one judge indicated a guilty verdict was appro-
priate "if it should appear beyond all doubt that these acts in question
were done by the prisoner." Unless they were "perfectly satisfied" the
jury had to acquit. 70 Another judge told the jury a guilty verdict should
be forthcoming "if your understandings are absolutely coerced to be-
lieve" the testimony of the witness.71 Coerced assent was, as we have
seen, equivalent to moral certainty and to Locke's highest degree of
probability. If, however, the jury had "any rational doubt" in their
"minds," they must acquit.72 A third judge combined the notions of con-
science, belief, and rational doubt. The jury was "to determine upon the
weight of . . . [their] observations, to consider the facts and circum-
stances" and decide if they "believe [the evidence] to be true." If, how-
ever, they felt "such a doubt as reasonable men may entertain," they
were bound to acquit.7 3 The fact that several judges employed the same
language alone should indicate that the terminology had gained wide-
spread acceptance.
The same mixture appears in the 1795 Trial of Leary. If the evi-
dence carried "conviction brought home to [the jurors'] minds, such a
conviction as leaves no doubt that the prisoner is... guilty," they had to
declare him so. "But if... [they] should have any doubt, such as reason-
able men may entertain," acquittal was appropriate. 74 In the 1796 Trial
68. WHOLE PROCEEDINGS OF OLD BAILEY 110-11 (London 1777).
69. Trial of Maclane, 26 Howell St. Tr. 721, 811 (Quebec 1797) (high treason). They
were also instructed to convict if they believed the evidence.
70. Trial of Weldon, 26 Howell St. Tr. 225, 280-281 (Dublin 1795) (high treason).
71. Id. at 286.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 289.
74. Trial of Leary, 26 Howell St. Tr. 295, 351 (Dublin 1795) (high treason). Jurors in the
same case were also told that they should decide "according to your conscience, and the best of
your judgments." Id. at 349-50; Trial of Kennedy, 26 Howell St. Tr. 353, 385-87 (Dublin 1796)
(same). In another 1796 case the judge informed the jury, "if you believe that from any ra-
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of Kennedy, the jury was told, "if you have no doubt, such as a rational
man may entertain," a guilty verdict was called for. But if they should
"entertain such a reasonable doubt," they must acquit.75 Jurors were
expected to conform to the model of the rational man.
In the 1796 Trial of Glennan, the judge instructed the jury, "if you
have a reasonable doubt, not such as idle or fanciful men may take upon
remote probabilities, but such as cannot satisfy your judgments upon
your oaths," they should acquit. "You are rational men, and you will
determine according to your consciences, whether you believe these men
guilty or not."'76 Here the language of belief, the satisfied conscience,
and "beyond reasonable doubt" are all linked together.
The "beyond reasonable doubt" standard was prominent in all the
turn of the century Irish treason trials. Yet nothing indicates that a new
standard was self-consciously enunciated. The new formula usually ap-
peared with statements that conviction rests on a satisfied conscience or
belief in the testimony of the witnesses. Most typically it was introduced
when judges added instructions about acquittal. I am not suggesting
here that juries had become more concerned with high levels of proof, for
they seemed to have expected it, but rather that the judiciary, in its
tional consideration," a particular witness was not entitled to credit, they must acquit. If they
were "in suspense" or "suspended in doubt" they should also acquit. Trial of Hart, 26 Howell
St. Tr. 387, 414, 419 (Dublin 1796) (same). In the 1797 Trial of Sheares, the judge indicated
that if the jury "entertain any rational doubt, not merely a capricious doubt, but the doubt of
sensible men," then they should acquit. Trial of Sheares, 27 Howell St. Tr. 255, 391 (Dublin
1798) (same). In a 1798 case jurors were advised that if they "entertain a fair and conscien-
tious doubt" as to the credit of the witnesses or to "the sufficiency of the evidence," they
should acquit. Trial of MacCann, 27 Howell St. Tr. 399, 453-54 (Dublin 1798) (same).
In still another 1798 Irish case, defense counsel indicated that if the jury's conscience were
satisfied on the evidence they should convict, but if they had a rational doubt they should
acquit. The judge noted that, if they were "not satisfied with the weight of the evidence, or
entertain[ed] such doubts upon the cases, as rational and conscientious minds may well indulge
in," they should acquit. If "satisfied" in their "consciences" that the evidence were true, they
must find the accused guilty. Trial of Byrne, 27 Howell St. Tr. 455, 494, 523 (Dublin 1798)
(high treason); see also Trial of Tuite, 27 Howell St. Tr. 1127, 1135 (Dublin 1799) (same); Trial
of Bond, 27 Howell St. Tr. 523, 611 (Dublin 1798) (same).
In 1803 Lord Nocking explained they were to acquit if they had a "rational and well
grounded doubt." Trial of Donnelly, 28 Howell St. Tr. 1069, 1097 (Dublin 1803) (high
treason).
75. Trial of Kennedy, 26 Howell St. Tr. 353, 386-87 (Dublin 1796) (high treason).
76. Trial of Glennan, 26 Howell St. Tr. 437, 457 (Dublin 1796) (conspiracy); see also
Trial of the Bishop of Bangor, 26 Howell St. Tr. 463, 527 (Shrewsbury assizes 1796) (riot).
The beyond reasonable doubt standard also appeared in the Trial of Finerty, 26 Howell St. Tr.
901, 1008 (K.B. 1797) (seditious libel). In the Trial of Finney the judge indicated that the
evidence must be "full and complete in your minds, and such as ought to satisfy your con-
science." They were to be "satisfied beyond all possibility of doubt, that the testimony which
you have heard is true." Trial of Finney, 26 Howell St. Tr. 1019, 1132 (Dublin 1798) (high
treason).
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charges to the jury, was articulating those high standards in language
consistent with and influenced by the terminology of the established phil-
osophical community.
The "beyond reasonable doubt" standard also appeared in a number
of American trials about the turn of the century. The 1798 Trial of Mat-
thew Lyon for seditious libel in the Circuit Court for the Vermont Dis-
trict indicates that the standard was being applied early in the history of
the new nation. The judge informed the jury, "you must be satisfied be-
yond all reasonable substantial doubt that the hypothesis of innocence is
unsustainable."
'77
Defense counsel in the Trial of the Northampton Insurgents before
the U.S. Circuit Court, 1799-1800, advised the jury to "remember that it
is enough for us in defence of the prisoner to raise a doubt; for, if you
doubt (it is the principle of law, as well as of humanity) you must ac-
quit." 78 A second defense counsel indicated that the presumption of in-
nocence must be maintained "until the contrary is proved by the most
incontrovertable evidence."' 79 The offense must be "proved in such a
manner as to leave no possibility of doubt on the minds of the jury. '80
Proof must "come from the purest sources, and be of that nature as to
establish the crime beyond the possibility of a doubt." The jury was also
reminded of the necessity of divesting themselves of "opinion or bias,...
otherwise there is not a fair scope for our reasonable faculties to act, nor
can our consciences be acquitted of guilt." 81 The prosecution in the case
indicated the testimony offered had been "produced ... to remove every
doubt" from the jury's "minds."' 82 The judge, like the prosecutor, in-
yoked the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard.83
The "beyond reasonable doubt" standard, however, was not uni-
formly applied until well into the 1800s, when it was defined as follows:
It is not merely possible doubt; because every thing relating to human
affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or
77. Trial of Lyon (D. Vt. 1799) (seditious libel), reprinted in F. WHARTON, STATE TRI-
ALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS
333, 336 (1849).
78. Trial of the Northampton Insurgents (D. Pa. 1799-1800) (open rebellion), reprinted
in F. WHARTON, supra note 77, at 458, 548.
79. Id. at 553.
80. Id. at 554.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 578.
83. Id. at 586. In the Trials of Richard Smith, defense counsel reminded the jury "if
there remain a single doubt, it is your duty to have that doubt completely removed, before you
convict .... " TRIALS OF RICHARD SMITH 206 (1816). The judge charged the jury to decide
"according to the law and to the evidence." Id. at 227.
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imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding con-
viction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge .... The evi-
dence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral
certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and
satisfies the reason and judgement .... This we take to be proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt .... 84
By mid-century, and probably as early as 1800, the "satisfied con-
science" and "beyond reasonable doubt" standard had become explicitly
linked. The addition of the concept of moral certainty reflected the de-
sire to make legal language consistent with the philosophical terminology
of the day. This terminology, however foreign to modem ears, was part
of the language and discourse of the educated classes in both England
and America. "Satisfied conscience," "reasonable doubt," and "moral
certainty" were widely used concepts, and these and related terms were
to be found in moral, theological, historical, and philosophical as well as
legal discourse.
III
The legal treatise on evidence was a new genre that emerged in the
early eighteenth century. These treatises suggest, even more than the
cases, that the evolution of the doctrine of proof beyond reasonable
doubt was linked to the changing philosophical scene. One of the most
interesting features of the treatises on evidence, and the more general
discussions of law, is that so many authors found it necessary to place
their treatments of legal evidence in the context of current epistemologi-
cal thought. It seemed to them essential to ground the rules of evidence,
which were the bulk of the treatises, on what was considered to be a
sound theory of knowledge. Legal rules, they evidently felt, could not
stand alone. Nor were they to be justified by tradition or by a special sort
of legal reasoning. The treatise writers attempted to demonstrate that
the rules of evidence, some of them centuries old, could and did rest on
sound notions of what constituted appropriate evidence and good proofs,
that is, on an intellectually satisfying theory of human knowledge. The
rules, then, though not directly derived from philosophical principles,
had to be seen as conforming to the sound epistemological and logical
principles developed by contemporary philosophy.
Several major Anglo-American writers attempted to integrate legal
evidence with the then-reigning empirical English philosophies. The two
84. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 320 (1850). This definition was
widely adopted. Morano, supra note 62, at 523 n.23
November 1986] "TO A MORAL CERTAINTY"
earliest writers, Sir Geoffrey Gilbert and John Morgan, relied on Locke
to provide the foundation for their treatises. James Wilson and David
Hoffman, who prepared more general lectures, leaned heavily on the
Scottish "common sense" philosophers of the eighteenth century, and
Thomas Starkie on a philosophical miscellany. Thus, if the earliest trea-
tises are liberally sprinkled with Locke, the later ones include generous
dashes of Hartley, Watt, Reid, Bentham, Paley, Stewart, and others.
The first real treatise on evidence, The Law of Evidence,8 5 was writ-
ten before 1726 by Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, a respected judge and legal
scholar, knowledgeable in the mathematical and scientific work of the
day. He was also the author of an abstract of John Locke's Essay on
Human Understanding. Not surprisingly, his posthumously published
treatise begins with a summary of Lockean principles:
There are several degrees from perfect Certainty and Demonstration,
quite down to Improbability and Unlikeness ... and there are several
Acts of the Mind proportioned to these Degrees of Evidence ... from
full Assurance and Confidence, quite down to Conjecture, Doubt, Dis-
trust and Disbelief. Now what is to be done in all Trials of Right, is to
range all Matters in the Scale of Probability, so as to lay most Weight
where the Cause ought to preponderate, and thereby to make the most
exact Discernment that can be, in Relation to the Right.86
The law did not have access to certain knowledge because litigation de-
pended on transient events "retrieved by Memory and Recollection."
The "Rights of Men" were therefore "determined by Probability," not
demonstration. 7 Assessment of probability, however, required careful
85. G. GILBERT, supra note 67. Editions appeared in 1756, 1760, 1761, 1769, 1777,
1791-94, 1795-97, 1801. His treatise was composed before 1726, the year of his death.
86. Id. at 1-2.
87. Id. at 3. Gilbert discussed both certainty and probability. Certainty is obtained by a
"clear and distinct perception" of the senses and a "way of knowledge by necessary Infer-
ences." Id. at 1- 2; see also G. GILBERT, ABSTRACT OF MR. LOCKE'S ESSAY 42, 45-47 (1752).
As we judge by our Experience, so also we judge by the Sight, Observation, and
Experience of others; and this is called Testimony. And in this light things are con-
siderable: 1) The Number. 2) The Integrity. 3) The Skill of the Witnesses. 4) Their
True Design and Interests. 5) The Consistency of the Parts and Circumstances of the
Relation. 6) Contrary Testimonies. 7) The Consistence of what is attested with our
own Observation and Experience. And 8) The Distance of such relators from the
Sight and View of the Thing which they attest; which is so far weakened as they
themselves take it from others, and the Thing related doth not fall under their own
View or Experience. These are the Criterions of Probability, though Facts depending
on mere human Agents ....
Id. at 48-49. For an important treatment of the history of evidence, see W. TwINING, THEO-
RIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985). Twining views Anglo-American evi-
dence scholarship from Gilbert on to be rooted in English empiricism, that is, in Locke,
Bentham, J. S. Mill, Sidgwick, and modem analytical philosophers such as A.J. Ayers. See id.
at 1-18.
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consideration of the degrees of credibility of the witnesses. There was no
more reason to doubt the statements of credible witnesses than if "we
ourselves had heard and seen" what the witnesses reported.88 Verdicts
would necessarily be devoid of absolute certainty or demonstration, but
trials, at least those with appropriately credible witnesses, might proceed
to verdicts which the jury had no reason to doubt.
John Morgan's 1789 Essay Upon the Law of Evidence similarly re-
lied on a Lockean conception of knowledge.8 9 He too indicated that
there are degrees of knowledge ranging from perfect certainty and dem-
onstration on the one hand to improbability and unlikeliness on the
other, and that there are acts of the mind proportioned to the evidence.
These ranged from "full assurance and confidence, to conjecture, doubt
and disbelief." Although legal proceedings "must judge on probability,"
nothing less than the "highest degree of probability must govern" the
courts.90 When one had reached a judgement based on "the honesty and
integrity of credible and disinterested witnesses" the mind had no choice
but to "acquiesce therein as if a knowledge by demonstration." The
mind "ought not any longer to doubt but, to be nearly if not as perfectly
well-satisfied as if we of ourselves knew the fact." 91
Morgan's "satisfaction" was also synonymous with judicial de-
mands for jury "satisfaction" or "satisfied conscience." Jury verdicts
must be based on the very highest knowledge available to man in matters
of fact. Morgan, like Gilbert, hoped to ground the law of evidence on a
sound epistemological foundation.
James Wilson, Professor of Law at the College of Philadelphia and
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, insisted in 1790
that the law was and must be "conformable to the true theory of the
human mind."' 92 Wilson's treatment centered on the concept of "belief,"
88. G. GILBERT, supra note 67, at 4. The 1795 revision contains references not only to
Locke but also to John Wilkins, Richard Price, David Hartley, and Isaac Watts. See Wald-
man, supra note 9, at 312-13.
89. J. MORGAN, ESSAYS UPON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London 1789). He also re-
ferred to Paley on evidence. 1 id. at 1.
90. Id. at 2-3. Witness credibility and circumstantial evidence governed judgment in
legal trials. Id. at 39, 48-49. The credibility of a witness was to be judged from his "state and
dignity in the world," his religiosity, moral condition, interest in the cause, intelligence, and
memory. Id. at 46. The quality, education, behavior, and understanding of a witness must
also be taken into account. Id. at 12-13; see also id. at 47, 146-255.
91. Id. at 3, 4-5. Morgan also discussed concurrent testimony, circumstantial evidence,
the doctrine of presumptions, and how to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Morgan, like
most later writers on evidence, devoted a good deal of time and space to a proper understand-
ing of presumptions and circumstantial evidence.
92. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 505 (J. Andrews ed. 1896) [hereinafter J. WILSON].
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whose most salient characteristic within and without the legal context
was that it admitted "of all possible degrees from absolute certitude
down to doubt and suspicion."'93 Wilson, however, was quite critical of
some aspects of Cartesian and Lockean conceptions of knowledge and
relied instead on the formulations of Thomas Reid and the Scottish
"common sense school," which would dominate Anglo-American episte-
mological discussion and moral philosophy in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. 94
Wilson, like most of his predecessors of the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth century, identified two varieties of reasoning, the de-
monstrative and the moral. The former yielded abstract and necessary
truths or the unchangeable relations of ideas. The latter dealt with "real
but contingent truths and connections which take place among things
actually existing."' 95 Although Wilson rejected some of the Lockean ter-
minology which he found in Gilbert and Blackstone, he noted that moral
evidence arose by "insensible gradation, from possibility to probability,
and from probability to the highest degree of moral certainty."' 96
Testimony was, for Wilson, the most important of some fourteen
sources of moral evidence. It not only provided the "greatest part" of
the jury's business but most knowledge of "men and things. ' 97 Testi-
mony not only provided the basis for "many parts of jurisprudence," but
for history, criticism, and "for all that acquaintance with nature and the
works of nature,.., founded on personal observation and experience." 9
8
"The whole stupendous fabric of natural philosophy" thus had the same
epistemological basis as the law.99
Wilson also enumerated and discussed the reasons for doubting or
rejecting testimony: that the thing or event appeared improbable, that
testimony might be given by those incompetent to judge the matter, by
someone who previously gave false testimony, or with a temptation to
deceive. Other elements which entered into the jury's evaluation were
the reputation of the witness and the manner in which testimony was
delivered. All these considered jointly would render the force of the tes-
timony believable or not. The concurrent testimony of many witnesses
deprived of the opportunity for collusion thus would be "equal to that of
93. Id. at 481.
94. Wilson had been educated in Scotland. See S. GRAVE, THE SCOTrISH PHILOSOPHY
OF COMMON SENSE 88-92 (1960).
95. J. WILSON, supra note 92, at 518.
96. Id. at 519; see also id. at 508-09.
97. Id. at 505.
98. Id. at 504-05.
99. Id. at 509.
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strict demonstration."'l00 Testimony and concurrent circumstances
might allow juries to gain a sense of moral certainty about facts and
events. The jury's belief thus required a considered "act of the mind." In
capital cases, Wilson thus insisted, the evidence must be so strong as to
"force belief." 101
Thus by the late eighteenth century the concepts of moral certainty
and proof beyond reasonable doubt were tightly linked together in the
philosophical literature, in the legal treatises, and in discussions of law
designed to reach the educated public. The language of these concepts
along with philosophically oriented statements concerning the nature of
human knowledge were also becoming commonplace in the early nine-
teenth century evidence treatises, although not every text included both
of these elements.
A brief review of some of the most influential treatises will suggest
the linkage. If Leonard McNally's The Rules of Evidence on Pleas of the
Crown 1 02 offers little in the way of philosophical underpinnings, McNally
nevertheless played a crucial role in enunciating and publicizing the "be-
yond reasonable doubt" standard-both in his role as defense counsel in
several of the turn of the century Irish treason trials and in his treatise on
evidence. McNally insisted that it was a rule of law that if a jury "enter-
tain a reasonable doubt" as to the truth of the testimony of the witnesses,
it must acquit. Reasonable doubt arose from testimony which the jury
judged not to "deserve credit." Such doubt might arise from the "in-
famy" of the witness' character, interest, and his manner of giving evi-
dence. Showing resentment or partiality, for example, might "impress
suspicion" of prevarication. If the witness' credibility was questionable
"unless his testimony be supported by clear and collateral proof...
doubt must arise in the minds of thejurors." 103 It was the "indispensable
duty" of the judges in charging the jury to ask "whether they are satis-
fied, beyond the probability of doubt, that [the defendant] is guilty."104
In The Philosophy of Evidence, Daniel McKinnon, like Gilbert,
Morgan, and Wilson, began with a brief discussion of certainty,
100. Id. at 503-04.
101. 2 id. at 232. Wilson raised the issue of the jurors' doubt while considering the prob-
lem of unanimous verdicts. If a "single doubt" remained in the mind of any juror, it must
produce the dissent of that particular juror. If that dissent was believed, all other jurors should
agree to an acquittal. Id. at 235. Wilson may have been the first to discuss the problem of
producing unanimous verdicts in the context of evidentiary concerns.
102. L. MCNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN (London &
Dublin 1802).
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. This rule, he noted, was fully accepted in the 1798 Dublin cases by both the court
and the prosecution.
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probability, and assent, and referred to the current epistemological theo-
rists of the day-Locke, Reid, and Stewart. 10 5 He thus made the by then
commonplace distinction between intuitive or demonstrative knowledge
and probable knowledge, under which he included presumption of indi-
rect as well as direct proofs. If demonstrative knowledge "exclude[s] all
possible doubt," probable and presumptive knowledge does not. De-
grees of certitude thus varied. For this reason rules were needed "to
restrain the latitude of individual opinion ... and [to] conduct the inves-
tigations of truth by a strict and methodical course of argument." The
law of evidence was "framed with this intention." 10 6 Although McKin-
non did not use the language of moral certainty, he indicated that juries
were to acquit if the evidence "is at all doubtful," and further indicated
that this "very humane rule" was "fortified by the presumption that
every man is innocent till his guilt appears."'
0 7
While Phillips' Theory of Presumptive Proof did not use the phrase
"beyond reasonable doubt," it did indicate that the "impression in the
mind of a jury in a criminal case" must not be "that the prisoner is prob-
ably guilty, but that he really and absolutely is so." If the jury had
doubts, they were to acquit.'08
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was not unusual
for discussions of legal evidence to include or refer to treatises on logic,
or for general discussions of logic and modes of proof to devote consider-
able attention to matters relevant to the law. Since most Anglo-Ameri-
can philosophy and epistemology was empirical in its orientation, a great
deal of attention was quite naturally devoted to questions relating to the
probability and certainty of arguments and evidence which related to
matters of fact.
While it is obviously not possible here to undertake a detailed dis-
cussion of the relationship between concepts of legal evidence and the
writings of moral philosophers, natural philosophers, and logicians, brief
comments on a few such writers should indicate the overlap between
members of the legal profession considering legal evidence and the writ-
ing on evidence in other areas. We have already noted the early depen-
dence on Locke. The next generation of writers relied more heavily on
David Hartley, Thomas Reid, and Isaac Watts, and still later ones on
105. D. McKINNON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE 20, 24, 25 (London 1812).
106. Id. at 25, 27. Common sense "must be the sole guide" for determining the jury's
belief. Id. at 53. McKinnon's discussion of presumption employed a slightly Anglicized ver-
sion of the categories of the Civilians. Id. at 56.
107. Id. at 27, 64.
108. S. PHILLIPS, THEORY OF PRESUMPTIVE PROOF 58 (London 1814), quoted in May,
Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L. REV. 642, 642-64, 658 (1876).
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James MacIntosh, Richard Kirwan and Dugald Stewart, and John Stu-
art Mill.
David Hartley's 1749 Observations on Man was frequently cited by
legal writers on issues of evidence and the nature of human knowledge.
Topics of relevance to legal writers might include the nature of assent
and dissent, the role of rational assent in mathematical and practical rea-
soning, and the differences between true, doubtful, and fictitious narra-
tions of fact. 10 9 Hartley noted that some facts were "practically certain"
while others were "liable to doubts."' 1 0
Isaac Watts' 1724 Logick, another frequently cited source, defined
logic as the "art of using Reason in our Inquiries after Truth," a concept
which he believed referred equally to the actions of life as to the natural
sciences. Perhaps of most interest to lawyers was his discussion of the
principles and rules of judgment in matters of human testimony."1I In
this connection, he indicated, one must ask whether the event in question
was possible, whether there were concurrent circumstances in addition to
testimony, and whether the character and knowledge of the testifier
made his testimony believable. If one theme dominated Watts' discus-
sion of evidence, it was the need to exactly proportion assent to the de-
gree of evidence. Where the evidence was insufficient, the mind was to
suspend assent.112 Most of the rules and principles were easily applica-
ble to the courtroom and it is not surprising that writers on legal evi-
dence found his discussions useful.
George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric also discussed evidence in
ways relevant to legal writers. Campbell largely limited his discussion to
"moral evidence" because the sphere of demonstrable evidence was so
small. He thus devoted a good deal of attention to experience and testi-
mony. The latter, he insisted, was capable of providing certainty. In-
deed, one must give an unlimited assent "when we have no positive
reason of mistrust or doubt."' 13 Many beliefs are based on moral evi-
dence which does not create doubts. All decisions of fact involve moral
evidence and these in turn involve degrees of certainty which range from
possible to probable, "to the summit of moral certainty."'' 4 Campbell
109. D. HARTLEY, OBSERVATIONS ON MAN 204-30 (London 1749).
110. Id. at 362.
111. I. WATTS, LOGICK, OR THE RIGHT USE OF REASON IN THE INQUIRY AFTER TRUTH
266-71 (London 1775) (1st ed.London 1724).
112. Id. at 175, 177, 247.
113. G. CAMPBELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC 55 (L. Bitzer ed. 1963) (1st ed.
London 1776); see also id. at 43, passim. This work was composed about 1750 and published
in 1776. It was frequently reprinted until 1911.
114. Id. at 44.
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not only employed the language of reasonable doubt and moral certainty,
but allied this language and other issues relating to assent to philology
and history, as well as to law. Certainly by the end of the eighteenth
century the concepts of moral certainty and proof beyond reasonable
doubt were widely circulated in the moral and philosophical literature.
Their introduction in legal writing and in the jury charges which
emerged late in the century should thus not be surprising.
The same development continued in the nineteenth century. Rich-
ard Kirwan's 1807 Logick, a general treatment of the logic of proof, in-
sisted that the rules of evidence and the logic on which they are based
must be "diligently attended to" in countries where "all men are liable to
set on juries."'1 15 Kirwan, in the manner of seventeenth and eighteenth
century natural theologians, discriminated between metaphysical, physi-
cal, and moral certainty, as well as between demonstrative and other
proofs.116 He not only discussed the bases for confident belief, "suspi-
cion, doubt, or hesitation,"'1 17 but devoted chapters to "indubitable
proofs productive of certainty," "ambiguous or suspicious proofs," "fal-
lacious proofs," and "probable proofs." He also gave considerable atten-
tion to direct and indirect proofs, the credibility of testimony, and
presumptions. References to law, legal writers, and legal situations were
thus not at all unusual in Kirwan's Logick. 1 8 Indeed, Kirwan appears
to have considered lawyers and prospective jurors as his primary audi-
ences. It is thus not at all surprising that David Hoffman should recom-
mend Kirwan's Logick to students of law or that other writers on legal
evidence should recommend logical and epistemologically oriented trea-
tises such as those of Locke, Hartley, Reid, Abercrombie, Kirwan, and
others. The list of recommended philosophical works, as one might ex-
pect, was modified over time and later writers favored Kirwan, Whately,
and John Stuart Mill over earlier works.
An example of this mutual borrowing or mutual reinforcement is
found in James Gambier's A Guide to the Study of Moral Evidence. The
editor of this work, which deals with evidence in a wide variety of types
of human knowledge, particularly emphasized the importance of such a
work for jurors. He insisted that it is they and not counsel alone who
"ought to be familiar with the rules of evidence." 119 Indeed, he com-
115. 1 R. KIRWAN, LOGICK; OR AN ESSAY IN THE ELEMENTS, PRINCIPLES, AND DIF-
FERENT MODES OF REASONING at i, x (London 1807).
116. Id. at 151.
117. Id. at 146; see also id. at 151, 224.
118. See, e.g., 2 id. at 354, 555.
119. J. GAMBLER, A GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF MORAL EVIDENCE: OR OF THAT SPECIES
OF REASONING WHICH RELATES TO MATTERS OF FACT AND PRACTICE 49 (1834).
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plained what a small portion of potential jurors "have ever received one
hour's direct instruction on the Science of Evidence." He recommended
that "Every child who may hereafter stand in a jury-box to decide on a
question of fact 'according to the evidence' ought to be instructed in the
laws of evidence; so that he may know for himself when a fact is proven,
and some of its details, to be imported even in the common school."'
120 It
was with that thought in mind that he introduced Gambier's treatise to
the public.
Gambier defined moral evidence as that "species of proof, which is
employed on subjects, directly or indirectly, connected with moral con-
duct." It was not, however, limited to those subjects, but was "extended
to all those facts, and events, concerning which we do not obtain the
evidence of sense, intuition, or demonstration, and to all the general
truths, which are deduced from observation."' 21 Indeed, it dealt with all
matters of fact.' 22 Moral evidence was to be distinguished from demon-
stration which led to absolute certainty, for the proofs involved in moral
evidence were fallible. They therefore could not produce absolute cer-
tainty but only "probable judgment, or at most moral certainty.' 23
Probability, however, might "rise so high, as to exclude all reasonable
doubt."' 124 Moral evidence involved degrees of assent ranging "from sus-
picion to moral certainty."' 25 The degree of assent depended on the de-
gree of evidence. "Thus when the evidence on one side preponderates a
very little, there is ground for suspicion, or conjecture. Presumption,
persuasion, belief, conclusion, conviction, moral certainty, doubt, waver-
ing, distrust, disbelief, are words which imply an increase or decrease of
this preponderancy."' 26 Lawyers and divines thus have their proofs, and
though they do not amount to demonstration, yet, if they be sufficient
to exclude all reasonable doubt, they ought to be admitted to be proofs.
In truth, wherever there is produced, in favour of any proposition, the
highest kind of evidence of which it admits, and in a sufficient degree
to outweigh all that can be urged against it, it may properly be said to
be proved. 127
Since the judgment required training in "estimating the relative worth of
different kinds of evidence,"' 28 the book was designed to describe the
120. Id. at 49, 50 (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 55.
122. Id. at 17.
123. Id. at 57.
124. Id. at 57-58.
125. Id. at 58.
126. Id. at 59. For further discussion of moral evidence, see id. at 59-66.
127. Id. at 66.
128. Id. at 17.
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proper sort of reasoning about moral evidence. 129
Although Gambier's Guide is not a legal treatise, its assumptions
about the nature of knowledge and the way one should reach judgments
in matters of fact were relevant to the legal community. The overlap
between the legal and nonlegal works is often so great that it is difficult to
know which should be labeled "legal" and which should not. What is
clear, however, is that the growing treatise literature played a part in the
wider intellectual currents and shared rather widely held views on the
nature of evidence and proof. The language of probability, certainty,
moral certainty, and belief beyond reasonable doubt was part of the dis-
course of the educated classes. The works I have cited were designed for
the literate reader, not for the professional philosopher.
Similar attention to legally relevant epistemological issues was pro-
vided by John Abercrombie, whose Issues Concerning the Intellectual
Powers and the Investigation of Truth 130 was not infrequently cited in the
evidence treatises. Not only did Abercrombie discuss probability, cer-
tainty, and the sources of certainty, but he also showed interest in the
role of testimony and doubts regarding testimony. He not only employed
the notion of high moral probability, but spelled out the grounds on
which one can receive testimony with confidence. If his readers accepted
his view that the "exercise of reason is precisely the same, and is guided
by the same laws, whether it be applied to the investigation of truth or to
the regulation of conduct," they must have found the interaction between
the evidence treatises and the more philosophically oriented treatments
of the nature of human knowledge both reasonable and normal.
131
James Glassford's Essays on the Principles of Evidence and Their
Applications to the Subject of Judicial Inquiry 132 again suggests the over-
lap between the philosophical and legal writing of the early nineteenth
century. Glassford's lengthy treatise was initially designed as an article
for the Supplement to the Encyclopedia Brittanica and was only pub-
lished as a free-standing work because it had become so lengthy. It was
thus "not intended altogether as a professional book."1 33 Glassford indi-
129. The book treats the different kinds of moral evidence, e.g., observation, testimony,
and mixed. Testimony is direct or incidental, spoken and written. The credibility of testimony
is also discussed. Report, tradition, analogy, and the differences between presumption and
proof are analyzed. The book also provides directions relating to moral reasoning.
130. J. ABERCROMBIE, ISSUES CONCERNING THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS AND THE IN-
VESTIGATION OF TRUTH (Edinburgh 1820).
131. Id. at 17-19, 79, 82-84, 89-93.
132. J. GLASSFORD, ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND THEIR APPLICA-
TIONS TO THE SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY (Edinburgh & London 1820).
133. Id. at ii-iii.
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cated that evidence might be treated generally as a part of logic or as a
part of particular sciences, and especially as a part of law134-a view that
would probably have seemed commonplace to nineteenth century read-
ers. Glassford therefore divided his treatise into two parts. The first dealt
with "The Nature and Sources of Evidence in General," the second with
"The Several Kinds of Legal Evidence, or the Evidence Receivable in the
Courts of Law."135 As one might expect, Glassford, whose theory of
evidence and proof was largely based on the then dominant Scottish
"common sense school" of philosophy, 136 dealt with the whole range of
evidentiary issues and concepts including probability, certainty, grada-
tions of certainty, moral certainty, testimony, and mental conviction be-
yond reasonable doubt. His work does not appear to have had any great
impact on the legal profession, perhaps because it attempted to draw on
both English and Scottish law, but like the works of Gambier and others,
it indicates the close relationship between legal and philosophical discus-
sions of evidence and truth determination.
Thomas Starkie's immensely influential Practical Treatise on the
Law of Evidence reflects the epistemological traditions we have been
describing. 137 Indeed the treatise is liberally sprinkled with references to
epistemological issues. Juries, Starkie insisted, must rely on the "general
principles of belief on which any individual would act who was desirous
of satisfying himself by inquiry as to the truth of any particular fact."' 38
Legal facts were no different from others, although the law sometimes
added special requirements such as excluding certain kinds of testimony
to insure that the search for truth would in no way be contaminated.
Starkie too distinguished between absolute certainty and the moral
certainty available in matters of fact:
Evidence which satisfies the minds of the jury of the truth of the fact in
dispute, to the entire exclusion of every reasonable doubt, constitutes
full proof of the fact ....
Even the most direct evidence can produce nothing more than
such a high degree of probability as amounts to moral certainty. From
the highest it may decline, by an infinite number of gradations, until it
produce in the mind nothing more than a mere preponderance of as-
sent in favour of the particular fact. 1
39
The test was "the sufficiency of the evidence to satisfy the understanding
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at vii-viii.
136. W. TWINING, supra note 87, at 3.
137. T. STARKIE, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. London
1833) (1st ed. London 1824).
138. Id. at 14-15.
139. Id. at 478.
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and conscience of the jury," 14 0 and it was sufficient when "they produce
moral certainty to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt."' 141 "[T]o
acquit upon light, trivial or fanciful suppositions, and remote conjecture,
is a virtual violation of the juror's oath .... On the other hand, a juror
ought not to condemn unless the evidence exclude from his mind all rea-
sonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused .... 1 42 Moral certainty was
equivalent to the highest degree of probability and both were indis-
soluably linked with the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard. "Satisfied
belief" and "satisfied conscience and understanding" gradually emerged
as the familiar "beyond reasonable doubt." With Starkie, the modem
standard was in place. The impact of his treatise was wide and deep and
influenced Anglo-American writers for many decades.
Thus, the influential early nineteenth-century American legal writer,
David Hoffman, also insisted that the science of evidence must be
founded on the closest observation of man's moral and intellectual na-
ture.143 Although Hoffman especially admired the recent treatises of
Phillips and Starkie, he still felt that the English law of evidence tended
to have "too little" recourse to the general principles of human action
and was impaired by "too strict adherence to the analogies of the com-
mon law." He also criticized English writers for their "almost total ne-
glect" of continental jurists such as Farinacius, Menochius, and Domat.
Hoffman recommended that the philosophical and logical works of Kir-
wan, De Moivre, Paley, Reid, Stewart, and of course Locke be consid-
ered more seriously.' 44 He further noted that "the effect to be allowed
to intrinsic evidence of that deduced from a combination of circum-
stances," had been "but little explored by the legal philosophers of any
country."' 45 This great work, if ever performed, could only be accom-
plished by "some preeminent genius."' 14
6
As one might expect, the legal writings of Jeremy Bentham have
140. Id. at 514.
141. Id.. Both direct and circumstantial evidence were capable of "producing the highest
degree of moral certainty." Id.
142. Id.
143. D. HOFFMAN, A LECTURE ON LAW 17 (Baltimore 1826).
144. Id. at 17-18.
145. Id. at 19.
146. Id. D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (Baltimore 1817) was widely read
and respected. His recommendations for reading included Locke's Essay, Paley's Moral and
Political Philosophy, Reid's Essays on the Power of the Human Mind, Pufendorf's Law of Na-
ture and Nations, and McNally's Rules of Evidence. Id. at 35-37. Bentham's early writings
were also discussed. Hoffman was also interested in the work of continental jurists and recom-
mended that American law students study the civil law. Id. at 235, 251-69. He particularly
recommended Domat on proofs and presumptions, and the evidentiary works of Everhardus,
Machardus, Menochius, and Farinacius. Id. at 269. The influence of these works, and partic-
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attracted more scholarly attention than those of most early treatise writ-
ers and commentators we have mentioned. While it is not possible to
discuss his enormously long and complex Rationale of Judicial Evi-
dence, 1 47 we must recall that Bentham's intention was to bring the law of
evidence into conformity with the rules of logic. Bentham's powerful
work exerted relatively little direct impact on the legal profession, in part
because of its intense criticism of the profession and in part because of his
radical desire to eliminate all formal rules of evidence. Nevertheless, the
work is important for our purposes because it too bears witness to the
powerful eighteenth- and nineteenth-century effort to ground the law of
evidence on principles of sound reasoning. As we have noted earlier,
Locke, Hartley, Reid, Paley, Abercrombie, Stewart, and others provided
the basis, or at least the epistemological starting point, for many writers
who concerned themselves with the problems of legal evidence. Bentham
is no exception.1 48 As one might anticipate, lengthy portions of his mas-
sive treatise explore notions of probability, improbability, and impossibil-
ity as well as the nature of testimony and circumstantial evidence, the
hindrances to truthful testimony, and degrees of persuasion. I49
As the nineteenth century progressed, the number of legal treatises
increased in all fields. These included not only general treatises on evi-
dence but specialized works dealing with circumstantial and presumptive
evidence, the latter in particular exhibiting considerable interest in episte-
mology and a receptiveness to civil-law writers such as Domat and
Pothier.1 50 Many of these works, too, employed the language of
ularly that of Domat, on nineteenth-century Anglo-American discussions of presumptive and
circumstantial evidence, requires investigation.
147. J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (London 1827).
148. See W. TWINING, supra note 87, at 26. For a thorough discussion of the Benthamite
approach to evidence, see id. at 19-108. Twining found Bentham's approach closer to that of
Locke and Hume than to the "common sense school." Id. at 29.
149. For a synopsis of The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, see id., at 28-47. For Bentham's
use of degrees of persuasion and moral certainty, see id. at 55-56. See also Postema, Fact,
Fictions, and Law: Bentham on the Foundations of Evidence, in FACTS IN LAW 37-64 (W.
Twining ed. 1983) (Archives for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Beicheft N.F.
16); Twining, Rule Scepticism in Bentham's Theory of Evidence, in FACTS IN LAW at 65-81.
150. See Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Form
of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 632-79 (1981); see also W. WILLS, AN ESSAY ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. London 1857) (1st ed. London 1838).
Wills' essay shares many features of the more general treatises. The essay was designed to
investigate the foundations of our faith in circumstantial evidence and to demonstrate that
circumstantial evidence is "a means of arriving at moral certainty." Id. at 274-75. Wills, who
indicated his dependence on Bentham and Starkie, noted that the English cases could, like
every other part of the "great system ofjurisprudence," be reduced "to consistent and immuta-
ble principles of reason and natural justice." Wills began with a general treatment of the
various kinds of evidence and the nature of the assurance produced by different kinds of evi-
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probability, moral certainty, and degrees of assent, and attempted to
ground their evidentiary standards on psychological and epistemological
positions of the day.
This pattern is to be found in Simon Greenleaf's Treatise on the Law
of Evidence, which was indebted to both Starkie and Phillips. This fa-
mous nineteenth-century American treatise followed the by then quite
conventional pattern of beginning with a brief discussion of epistemol-
ogy. In addition to incorporating the epistemological authorities cited by
Starkie and Phillips, Greenleaf utilized Whately's Logic, Gambier's
dence. He wished to make the principles of legal evidence conform to the principles of evidence
in philosophy, that is, to conform to the way one arrives at and draws conclusions from human
knowledge. Judicial evidence is thus seen as part of logic. Id. at 135. Truth is of two kinds,
"abstract and necessary," or probable and contingent, and each involves different kinds of
evidence. Most truths are "probable," and have "no other guide than our own consciousness
or the testimony of our fellow men." Id. at 16-17. This Wills labeled "moral evidence...
probably because its principal application is to subjects directly or remotely connected with
moral conduct and relations." Testimony is the "most comprehensive and important" basis of
moral evidence; indeed, to treat the subject of testimony "would be to treat of the conduct of
the understanding in relation to the greater portion of human affairs." Id. at 18. Wills' essay
would thus be limited to the much smaller realm of circumstantial evidence. Id. at 18. In
typical fashion, Wills distinguished moral evidence from demonstration and described the
kind of certitude to be found in each. The degrees of certitude in the moral realm range from
"moral certainty, the highest .... to that of mere probability, the lowest." Id. at 19. He then
discussed probability, including both its mathematical and nonmathematical forms. Citing
Dugald Stewart's Elements and the Encyclopedia Brittanica article on Metaphysics, Wills
noted that moral certainty was "that degree of assurance which induces a man of sound mind
to act without doubt upon the conclusions to which it leads." Id. at 21. "[I]f evidence leave
reasonable ground for doubt, the conclusion cannot be morally certain . . . ." Id. at 22. The
phrases "moral certainty" and "beyond reasonable doubt" are here inextricably intertwined.
Wills' discussion of presumptions is deeply indebted to the writings of the Civilians. He also
discussed the relationship between circumstantial and direct evidence, as well as the rules of
induction which were specially applicable to circumstantial evidence. Rule 5 includes the rea-
sonable doubt standard. Wills concluded that "moral certainty" was the appropriate standard
for circumstantial evidence, and indicated its superiority to the continental codes, which pre-
scribed precisely the kind and amount of evidence required for legal proof. Id. at 236.
W.M. BEST, A TREATISE ON PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW AND FACT WITH THE THEORY
AND RULES OF PRESUMPTION OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES (Philadel-
phia 1845), similarly assumed that "a right perception of the theory and limits of legal pre-
sumption" requires at least some discussion of the nature of evidence, proof, and presumption.
His work begins with a Lockean discussion of the nature of human knowledge. Id. at 1-2. He
then distinguished between demonstration and probable reasoning or judgment and discussed
their respective characteristics. See id. ch. 1, §§ 1-8. Best also adopted the moral certainty
standard of Starkie. Id. § 195, Rule 1, at 155. One of his rules was that "evidence against the
accused should be such as to exclude, to a moral certainty, every hypothesis but that of his
guilt of the offense imputed to him." Id. § 210, Rule 3, at 168 (citing Starkie and Wills). But
his indebtedness to the Civilians, which he took great pains to point out, was very great. He
was also indebted to Bentham. Like many nineteenth-century writers on probable evidence,
Best discussed the application of mathematical probabilities to judicial evidence. See also A.
BURRILL, A TREATISE ON THE NATURE, PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL Evi-
DENCE (New York 1856).
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Guide to the Study of Moral Evidence, Abercrombie's On the Intellectual
Powers, McKinnon's Philosophy of Evidence, and Reid's Inquiry into the
Human Mind to support his discussion of the difference between mathe-
matical and moral evidence, and his discussion of the "grounds of
Belief."
Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant,
not only that kind of evidence, which is employed on subjects con-
nected with moral conduct, but all the evidence, which is not obtained
either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of
life, we do not require demonstrative evidence .... and to insist upon
it would be unreasonable and absurd. The most that can be affirmed of
such things is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them. The
true question therefore, in trials of fact, is not, whether it is possible
that the testimony may be false, but whether there is a sufficient
probability of its truth, that is whether the facts are shown by compe-
tent and satisfactory evidence .... By satisfactory evidence ... is in-
tended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an
unprejudiced mind beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances,
which will amount to this degree of proof, can never be previously
defined; the only legal test of which they are susceptible, is their suffi-
ciency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man, and so to
convince them, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in
the matters of the highest concern and importance to his own
interest. 151
What is interesting about Greenleaf's formulation, from a historical
point of view, is that "satisfied mind" and "satisfied conscience," the for-
mulas most common in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century
charges to the jury, were explicitly equated with the concept of "beyond
reasonable doubt. " Greenleaf, like most of his predecessors, also insisted
that the courtroom shared its principles of evidence with the historian,
the naturalist, the traveller, and the astronomer. 152 Thus one of the bases
of evidence, the connection between "collateral facts or circumstances,
satisfactorily proved, and the fact in controversy," was viewed simply as
the legal application "of a process familiar in natural philosophy, show-
ing the truth of an hypothesis by its coincidence with existing phenom-
ena."153 The force of the connections and coincidences, which may be
151. S. GREENLEAF, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 4-5 (2d ed. Boston 1844)
(emphasis in original). Greenleaf also noted that
our faith in human testimony, is sanctioned by experience; that is upon the generally
experienced truth of the statements of men of integrity, having capacity and opportu-
nity for observation, and truth. This belief is strengthened by our previous knowl-
edge of the narrator's reputation for veracity; by the absence of conflicting testimony;
and by the presence of that, which is corroborating and cumulative.
Id. at 14.
152. Id. at 14.
153. Id. at 15.
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either physical or moral, thus "depends on their sufficiency to exclude
every other hypothesis but the one under consideration."' 154 Greenleaf
also indicated that the doctrines of presumptive evidence which were so
important to law were "shared ... in common with other departments of
science." 55
Although most early- and mid-nineteenth century treatises empha-
sized the similarity between legal reasoning and evidence and ordinary
reasoning and evidence, it must be admitted that James Thayer's influen-
tial A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law represented
a departure from this position. Because Thayer distinguished the eviden-
tiary method of the law from that of the natural sciences and history, it is
not surprising that he did not attempt to ground his treatise on the epis-
temological treatises of the day.'
56
If Thayer represents something of a departure from earlier tradition,
John Wigmore's monumental The Principles of Judicial Proof as Given by
Legal, Psychological, and General Experience157 is more typical of the
treatises of earlier writers, with its emphasis on the close connections
between legal evidence and ordinary reasoning. Indeed, Wigmore in-
sisted that the principles of proof, the ratiocinative process of persuasion,
were of far greater importance than the rules of admissibility. For Wig-
more the principles of proof were "the natural processes of the mind in
154. Id.
155. Id. at 18; see also id. at 50-51, 54-55.
156. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
(1898). Thayer appears to have been of two minds as to whether or in what degree legal
evidence and reasoning differ from that of other fields of inquiry. At one point his treatise
distinguishes legal evidence from evidence of history and religion, id. at 284, and insists that
legal evidence is concerned with what is admissible, not what is "logically probative." Id. at
268-69. Yet he also admitted that the rules of legal argument are "mainly an affair of logic and
general experience, not legal precept," and do not call "into play any different faculties or
involve any new principles or methods." Id. at 271. According to Thayer, legal reasoning
does not differ "in any fundamental respect from any other reasoning," and lawyers possess no
"peculiar organs or methods for tracking and apprehending the truth. What is called the 'legal
mind' is still the human mind, and it must reason according to the laws of its constitution."
Id. at 272. But for Thayer, if legal reasoning is "at bottom ... like all other reasoning," there
are nevertheless "a thousand practical considerations" which shape it. It is thus both the same
and different, and he tended to emphasize the differences more than the similarities. Thayer
thus represented something of a departure from previous thinkers. On the one hand, he differ-
entiated legal reasoning from mathematical reasoning on the traditional ground that the law
does not deal with demonstration and that it "deals with probabilities and not with certain-
ties," but, unlike most of his predecessors, he also distinguished it from other types of evidence
which deal with probabilities. Id. at 273-75. For Thayer's differentiation of the rules of evi-
dence and the precepts of logic, see W. TWINING, supra note 87, at 6-8.
157. J. WIGMORE THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF As GIVEN BY LEGAL, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE (2d ed. 1931). For an important recent discussion of
Wigmore, see W. TWINING, supra note 87, at 109-66.
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dealing with evidential facts after they are admitted to the jury; while the
rules of admissibility represent artificial legal rules."15 8 Indeed, Wig-
more believed, albeit erroneously, that there had been very little interest
in the principles of proof and that he was the first scholar since Bentham
to emphasize those principles and to distinguish them from admissibility.
It was the former that "bring[s] into play those reasoning processes
which are already the possession of intelligent and educated persons."'
5 9
William Twining, Wigmore's most recent analyst, has suggested, "Wig-
more's epistemology... adopted without fuss or argument, a common
sense empiricism in the tradition of Locke, Bentham, and John Stuart
Mill' 160 As Twining has noted, Wigmore was especially anxious to in-
troduce rationality into the field of evidence and to ground the principles




From the late seventeenth to at least the early twentieth century and
beyond, most if not all legal scholars were devoted to showing that the
standards of evidence and proof in the law conformed to the standards of
evidence and proof available in all other forms of inquiry. The "beyond
reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty" standard that has been so
central to Anglo-American courts for well over a century was the result
of this effort.
The "beyond reasonable doubt" standard articulated in both the
cases and the evidence treatises stemmed from the late seventeenth- cen-
tury cluster of ideas associated with the concept of moral certainty and
with, to use Lockean terminology, the highest degree of probability.
Once it became evident that trial by jury required the critical evaluation
of witnesses, legal thinkers began to adopt current philosophical ideas
about dealing with matters of fact. The writings of Wilkins, Tillotson,
Boyle, and Locke, and later Paley, Hartley, Watt, Reid, Stewart, Gain-
bier, Whately, and Mill thus played a major role in the evolution of An-
glo-American concepts of evidence. Although one might wish to go
behind these thinkers and investigate the contribution of scholastic phi-
losophy and Roman law, there can be little doubt that eighteenth- and
early nineteenth-century legal practitioners and writers attempted to
158. J. WIGMORE, supra note 157, at 3-5.
159. Id. at 5-6.
160. W. TWINING, supra note 87, at 125; see also id. at 114-16.
161. Id. at 116; see also id. at 119-22.
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bring English law into conformity with the most advanced philosophical
thought.
Early in the seventeenth century the concern for evaluating evidence
was encapsulated in "satisfied conscience" or "satisfied belief" formulas
that resonated to the moral and religious obligations of jurors serving
under oath. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the con-
cepts of probability, degrees of certainty, and moral certainty were
poured into the old formulas so that they emerged at the end of the eight-
eenth century as the secular moral standard of "beyond reasonable
doubt."
I am not suggesting that most technical rules of evidence flowed
from philosophical principles, but rather that such rules, some of them
old and venerable, could be modernized and defended through an alli-
ance with contemporary philosophy. Thus allied, they might be viewed
as both rational and in harmony with the best understanding of the
human mind. In this way, selective use of philosophical formulations
helped to secure continued legitimacy for the jury trial and the Anglo-
American legal system.
Although this article is largely historical and has been primarily de-
voted to describing changes in Anglo-American criminal evidentiary
standards and their relation to theories of knowledge, its findings are ob-
viously relevant to contemporary dissatisfaction with current legal termi-
nology. Before the legal profession and the legislatures move in the
direction of modifying or eliminating such terminology, they ought to
seriously consider whether it might be worth preserving the important
intellectual developments that lie behind it. Despite the changes in ter-
minology we have traced over the centuries, the goal has remained essen-
tially the same. The earliest standards we have identified were "satisfied
belief" and "satisfied conscience." They were succeeded by "satisfied
mind" or "satisfied understanding," or something closely approximating
them. Gradually this language, too, was replaced by the concept of
"moral certainty" and "beyond reasonable doubt."
Throughout this development two ideas to be conveyed to the jury
have remained central. The first idea is that there are two realms of
human knowledge. In one it is possible to obtain the absolute certainty
of mathematical demonstration, as when we say that the square of the
hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the
other two sides. In the other, which is the empirical realm of events,
absolute certainty of this kind is not possible. The second idea is that, in
this realm of events, just because absolute certainty is not possible, we
ought not to treat everything as merely a guess or a matter of opinion.
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Instead, in this realm there are levels of certainty, and we reach higher
levels of certainty as the quantity and quality of the evidence available to
us increases. The highest level of certainty in this realm in which no
absolute certainty is possible is what traditionally has been called moral
certainty.
There is little doubt that "moral certainty" no longer conveys these
two ideas, but it may be worthwhile to continue to convey them. To
further that task I present the following proposed jury instruction as a
supplement to a revised reasonable doubt instruction that omits "moral
certainty":
We can be absolutely certain that two plus two equals four. In the real
world of human actions we can never be absolutely certain of anything.
When we say that the prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, we do not mean that you, the jury, must be
absolutely certain of the defendant's guilt before finding the defendant
guilty. Instead, we mean that you should not find the defendant guilty
unless you have reached the highest level of certainty of the defend-
ant's guilt that it is possible to have about things that happen in the
real world and that you must learn about by evidence presented in the
courtroom.
Surely experienced judges and legislators can improve on this lan-
guage. I think the attempt ought to be made before we abandon a three-
centuries-old tradition of seeking to explain to juries in simple language
the theories that underlie Anglo-American culture and that ought to be
identified in all processes of knowing, including knowing guilt or
innocence.
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